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I. INTRODUCTION 
In July 2013 the Supreme Court held in FTC v. Actavis that courts 
ought to apply the rule of reason1 when deciding whether a particular 
reverse payment settlement (“RPS”) constitutes an illegal restraint on 
trade. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari2 in response to the 
petition by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) on the following 
question: 
Whether reverse-payment agreements are per se lawful unless the 
underlying patent litigation was a sham or the patent was obtained by 
fraud (as the court below held), or instead are presumptively anticom-
petitive and unlawful (as the Third Circuit has held).3 
A reverse payment agreement or settlement (RPS) typically oc-
curs when a patented drug manufacturer “agrees to pay a large sum of 
money to an accused infringer (its would-be competitor), and the 
competitor agrees that it will no longer challenge the patent and will 
not enter the market for a specified period of time.”4 As the FTC 
pointed out in its petition, there was an important and recent split 
among courts regarding the desirability and legality of RPSs,5 and this 
                                                                                                                  
1. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., No. 12-416, slip op. at 20–21 (U.S. June 17, 2013). 
2. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012). 
3. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., No. 12-416 (U.S. June 17, 
2013). 
4. Id. at 2.  
5. Id. at 10–11; see also infra Part II.C (discussing antitrust litigation involving reverse 
payment settlements and the recent split among courts). 
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split is paralleled by an academic debate among law and economics 
scholars.6 In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision and the im-
portance of the issue to both the pharmaceutical industry and consum-
ers, it is crucial that we properly understand the costs and benefits of 
RPSs and the effects of restricting their use. 
This Article demonstrates that both judges and academics have 
erroneously associated a particular dynamic cost with illegalizing 
RPSs. Specifically, many courts, including the Second and Eleventh 
Circuits, and legal scholars have argued or assumed that illegalizing 
RPSs would likely retard technological progress by making it difficult 
to maintain monopoly profits on a contested patent, thereby reducing 
the reward for becoming a patentee.7 This Article illustrates that this 
                                                                                                                  
6. Beyond a split in the circuits on the validity of such agreements, a quick search of law 
review articles on WestLaw using the search term “reverse payment settlements” produced 
over 150 articles on the subject. Various articles point out the anticompetitive or welfare-
reducing potential of RPSs. See, e.g., David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: 
The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321 (2000); Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, 
Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2012); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlements of Intellectual Property Dis-
putes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 
34 RAND J. ECON. 391 (2003). On the other hand, other articles discuss the dangers associ-
ated with using restrictive rules that make RPSs presumptively or per se illegal. See, e.g., 
Sumanth Addanki & Alan J. Daskin, Patent Settlement Agreements, in 3 ABA SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 2127 (Wayne Dale Collins et 
al. eds., 2008); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes 
Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491 (2002); Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, 
Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Posi-
tion on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
57 (2010); Bret M. Dickey & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Would the Per Se Illegal Treatment of 
Reverse Payment Settlements Inhibit Generic Drug Investment?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 615 (2012); James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements 
To Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded 
to Generic Drug Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777 (2003); Robert D. Willig & John P. 
Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Toward Agreements that Settle Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 655 (2004). 
7. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“Rules severely restricting patent settlements might also be contrary to the goals of the 
patent laws because the increased number of continuing lawsuits that would result would 
heighten the uncertainty surrounding patents and might delay innovation.”); Schering-
Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that “a rule that fore-
closes a patentee’s ability to settle its infringement claim” increases the duration of uncer-
tain litigation, and thereby may decrease the parties’ “ability to research, develop, and 
market” their drugs); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (“[E]xposing settling parties to antitrust liability for the exclusionary effects of a 
settlement reasonably within the scope of the patent merely because the patent is subse-
quently declared invalid would undermine the patent incentives.”); In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining that 
“a rule that makes it per se illegal to settle a Hatch-Waxman lawsuit” may prevent brand 
from controlling or limiting and make them “less inclined to invest the research and devel-
opment (‘R & D’) costs associated with bringing new drugs to the market”); Daniel A. 
Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and 
Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 760 (2002) (“A rule prohibiting exit payments 
may . . . increas[e] the risks of engaging in inventive activity, and therefore lead to a sub-
optimal amount of innovation . . . [T]he patentee would not have created the invention at 
4  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 27 
 
conclusion is unwarranted by using a formal game-theoretical model 
to prove that, under a range of conditions, restricting RPSs increases 
firms’ incentives to engage in research and development (“R&D”) for 
a variety of technologies. Specifically, RPSs channel pharmaceutical 
companies’ investment in R&D toward relatively obvious and weak 
inventions. This channeling or reward shifting effect, which so far has 
gone unnoticed, converts what scholars have previously identified as a 
dynamic cost8 of illegalizing RPSs into a potential benefit. The reward 
shifting effect may therefore tip the cost-benefit analysis in favor of 
more frequently disallowing RPS arrangements, as suggested by the 
Third Circuit,9 especially since the Second and Eleventh Circuits, as 
well as a number of district courts, have relied on the erroneous as-
sumption that RPSs foster innovation when justifying their permissive 
treatment of RPSs.10 
The reward shifting effect, however, is only one of the many ram-
ifications associated with allowing RPSs. To better understand the 
various effects of RPSs, one must appreciate the circumstances under 
which such agreements take place.11 RPSs occur under the peculiar 
                                                                                                                  
issue had it not been for her ex ante expectation of legal protection from free-riding.”); 
Dickey & Rubinfeld, supra note 6, at 622 (observing that “[a] settlement makes the brand 
manufacturer better off (or the brand manufacturer would not have agreed to such a settle-
ment) and as a result increases the incentive to invest in R&D relative to a world in which 
such settlements are outlawed”); Langenfeld & Li, supra note 6, at 778 (“These settlements 
can increase firms’ incentive to undertake R&D investment . . . . [A] strict per se illegal 
treatment of such payments would unduly limit the patent holder’s ability to protect its 
intellectual property rights, reducing total consumer welfare in the long run.”). 
8. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 7, at 759–62, (The author characterized this incentive effect 
as an “Innovation Cost” and stated, “The option to settle patent lawsuits, then, is a valuable 
right that will make a risk-averse inventor more likely to commit capital to patentable re-
search and development projects. Conversely, the absence of that option will make risk-
averse firms somewhat less likely to commit capital to research and development projects. 
The absence of a non-entry settlement right, therefore, imposes a social cost: some firms 
will be less likely to commit capital to potentially productive research and development, 
which is the goal of the patent laws.”). 
9. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated (“[W]e will 
direct the District Court to apply a quick look rule of reason analysis based on the economic 
realities of the reverse payment settlement rather than the labels applied by the settling 
parties. Specifically, the finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent holder to a 
generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie evidence 
of an unreasonable restraint of trade, which could be rebutted by showing that the payment 
(1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.”). 
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra Part II (demonstrating how courts 
have relied on this erroneous assumption). 
11. See infra Part II.B, for a brief summary of the regulatory framework under the Hatch-
Waxman Act; see also Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 63–66; C. Scott Hemphill & Mark 
A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 
ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 951–58 (2011); David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and 
Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1306–
07 (2010) (reviewing the relevant aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
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framework structured by the Hatch-Waxman Act (“HWA”),12 which 
regulates entry of a generic drug manufacturer (“G”) into the patented 
drug market. The HWA lowers the cost of entry to G by allowing it to 
file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) with the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”).13 By submitting an ANDA, G es-
sentially skips new and costly clinical trials by demonstrating that its 
drug is the bioequivalent14 of a previously-approved branded drug. If 
that branded drug is also patented, and G seeks to enter the market 
prior to patent expiration, then G must include a “Paragraph IV” certi-
fication in its ANDA, stating that the relevant patent is either invalid 
or will not be infringed by the marketing of the proposed generic 
drug.15 This act constitutes patent infringement,16 which allows the 
branded drug manufacturer (“P”) to sue G for infringement. Only af-
ter this process would the parties agree to an RPS.  
In the typical RPS, G agrees to delay entry in exchange for a large 
sum of money from P.17 The parties’ incentives to reach an RPS can 
be understood by focusing on the surplus generated by such agree-
ments. When G’s entry is delayed, P preserves its monopoly — i.e., 
its ability to charge supra-competitive prices for its branded drug. The 
profit made by P alone is greater than the combined profit P and G 
would make if they competed against each other.18 Furthermore, the 
parties can avoid litigation costs by settling.19 Therefore, an RPS gen-
erates a surplus equal to the difference between monopoly profits and 
duopoly profits plus litigation costs.20 A simple application of the 
Coase Theorem reveals that P and G have the necessary incentives to 
                                                                                                                  
12. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections at 21 U.S.C. (2012); 28 
U.S.C. (2006); 35 U.S.C. (2006)). 
13. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 63–64.  
14. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B) (2012) (defining “bioequivalent”).  
15. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). See infra Part II.B, for a brief review of the three other certi-
fications, namely Paragraphs I, II, and III, that a generic entrant may file. This Article is 
mainly concerned with Paragraph IV certifications. 
16. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006). 
17. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193–94 (2d Cir. 
2006) (considering a generic challenger’s agreement to delay entry in exchange for $21 
million RPS and a non-exclusive license). 
18. This follows from the reasonable assumption that monopoly profits are greater than 
combined duopoly profits. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 
92, 92 (2006) (assuming that “combined duopoly proﬁts are less than monopoly proﬁts, 
2πD < πM”). If this assumption were not true, the monopolist could increase its profits simply 
by dividing itself into two entities, and have them compete against each other. This would 
be a violation of the assumption that the monopolist was making monopoly profits. 
19. See infra Part IV, for a review of the law and economics literature on settlements. 
The primary social benefit of settlements is the reduction of litigation costs.  
20. This statement assumes that G may enter with certainty. If its likelihood of entry is 
less than 100%, then the surplus generated through settlement is proportional to that likeli-
hood. See infra Parts IV and V, for an analysis of cases where G’s likelihood of entry de-
pends on patent strength, and consider all probabilities of entry. 
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reach a settlement to capture and share the surplus generated through 
this option.21  
Whether RPSs are pro-competitive (promote social welfare) or 
anti-competitive (detract from social welfare) is a very complex ques-
tion and has drawn enormous attention from law and economics 
scholars in recent years.22 The literature has generally been quite suc-
cessful in identifying costs and benefits associated with RPSs and 
conditions under which such costs or benefits are likely to be signifi-
cant. Scholars critical of RPSs have pointed out the collusive effect of 
these arrangements.23 According to these scholars, RPSs allow P to 
preserve its monopoly, which shrinks sales volume and increases 
deadweight loss.24 Other scholars have suggested that certain RPSs 
can have pro-competitive virtues that should be weighed against such 
costs.25 These benefits include reducing litigation costs26 and uncer-
tainty,27 and allowing liquidity-constrained generic manufacturers to 
survive until market entry.28 Furthermore, a line of case law and some 
prominent scholars have suggested that another cost of illegalizing 
RPSs is its effect of retarding technological progress by reducing the 
rewards of becoming a patentee.29 However, there is no empirical 
support for this last proposition.30 In fact, as this Article demonstrates, 
illegalizing RPSs may increase, rather than reduce, the rewards of 
                                                                                                                  
21. See infra Part IV.B.I, for a formal derivation of this result through an economic mod-
el of settlement. This result relies on parties not being relatively over-optimistic. See infra 
Part V.D, for a detailed consideration of relative over-optimism. 
22. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
23. See, e.g., Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 6, at 284–85; Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 
supra note 6, at 1722; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 392–93. 
24. See, e.g., Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 6, at 293 (noting that because the patent 
holder can charge monopoly prices, settlements reduce consumer welfare “if the settlement 
excludes the entrant from the market for a larger portion of the patent’s remaining life than 
one would have expected to result from litigation”); Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra 
note 6, at 1722 (observing that “parties to an IP dispute have a strong incentive to enter into 
agreements that maximize their own interests but disserve the public’s interest” by 
“maximizing their own profits” instead of “enhancing the public welfare”). 
25. See, e.g., Blair & Cotter, supra note 6, at 525–26; Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 
62–63; Crane, supra note 7, at 749–50; Dickey & Rubinfeld, supra note 6, at 618–19. 
26. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 7, at 749 (“A rule strictly prohibiting payments to settle 
patent litigation may mean that firms must engage in expensive and inefficient litigation to 
resolve a patent dispute even though they might be able to avoid the cost of protracted liti-
gation through a settlement. The cost of patent litigation, which may frequently amount to 
many millions of dollars, will be passed on to consumers like any other cost.”). 
27. See, e.g., Addanki & Daskin, supra note 6, at 2133–34; Butler & Jarosch, supra note 
6, at 95–97; and Crane, supra note 7, at 772 (discussing risk-aversion and the role of settle-
ments in reducing uncertainty). 
28. See, e.g., Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 98 (noting that a reverse payment could 
be pro-competitive if it allows a cash-poor generic drug manufacturer to survive until it 
enters the market). 
29. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
30. See, e.g., Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 113 (stating there is an “absence of mean-
ingful empirical evidence on the aggregate effects that reverse payments have on competi-
tion or output”). 
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becoming a patentee for less obvious and more revolutionary inven-
tions.31 Thus, there is a fallacy, albeit a subtle one, in the reasoning 
that has led judges and scholars to conclude that illegalizing RPSs is 
likely to retard technological progress.  
To illustrate this subtle fallacy, it is best to start by describing the 
correct observations in the literature. Previous commentary and arti-
cles on RPSs have correctly identified two points: (1) illegalizing 
RPSs removes an option which would otherwise be available to P and 
G, and (2) a simple application of the Coase Theorem reveals that the 
removal of this option reduces the ex-post expected return to P and 
G.32 At first glance, these two observations seem to imply that illegal-
izing RPSs has the effect of reducing the reward of becoming a pa-
tentee by reducing the ex-post expected return. 
This deduction contains a subtle error. It implicitly assumes that 
G’s decision to challenge P’s patent is exogenous to the legal regime. 
However, illegalizing RPSs reduces the ex-post return not only to P, 
but also to G.33 Therefore, when RPSs are illegalized, G is expected to 
challenge P’s patent under fewer circumstances. Specifically, G is 
expected to lack the incentives to challenge P’s patent when the patent 
is relatively strong, i.e., when a court is less likely to invalidate P’s 
patent and more likely find it infringed.34 If RPSs are illegalized, a P 
holding strong patents would expect to face fewer challenges, saving 
an amount equal to settlement payments that it would have otherwise 
paid to G. This increases strong-patent P’s rewards to becoming an 
inventor. Therefore, contrary to what has been argued or assumed in 
court opinions and previous literature, illegalizing RPSs does not re-
duce the rewards to holding a relatively strong patent; it increases 
them. 
This observation implies that per se legality may not provide the 
dynamic benefits that scholars have taken for granted. Furthermore, 
the same observation does not affect the static benefits associated with 
presumptive illegality previously identified by scholars.35 Under pre-
sumptive illegality, once the parties’ ability to make monetary trans-
                                                                                                                  
31. See infra Part V, where this result is formalized using a game-theoretical model.  
32. See, e.g., Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 
2003) (“A ban on reverse-payment settlements would reduce the incentive to challenge 
patents by reducing the challenger’s settlement options should he be sued for infringement, 
and so might well be thought anticompetitive.”); Dickey & Rubinfeld, supra note 6, at 622 
(“[S]ettlement makes the brand manufacturer better off (or the brand manufacturer would 
not have agreed to such a settlement) . . . . If the generic does opt to settle rather than liti-
gate, it is clearly better off (otherwise it would not have chosen to settle).”). 
33. See, e.g., Dickey & Rubinfeld, supra note 6, at 618–19; Linda Gratz, Economic 
Analysis of Pay-for-Delay Settlements and Their Legal Ruling 2–5 (Jan. 4, 2012) (working 
paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979699. 
34. See infra Part III.C and the references cited therein, for a more detailed discussion of 
patent strength and probabilistic patents. 
35. See, e.g., Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 6, at 293; Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, su-
pra note 6, at 1722. 
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fers through RPSs is removed, G cannot be compensated for delaying 
entry until patent expiration. Thus, the parties are forced into either 
litigation or a delayed entry settlement (“DES”),36 where G enters the 
market prior to patent expiration and no monetary payments are made 
between the parties.37 This shortens the amount of time in which P 
can charge monopoly or supra-competitive prices, and therefore in-
creases consumer welfare.38 Moreover, unless the parties are relative-
ly over-optimistic, they can avoid litigation through DESs even when 
RPSs are restricted, and the illegality of RPSs should have no impact 
on litigation costs.39  
Therefore, absent “probably rare”40 circumstances, restricting 
RPSs leads to static benefits without increasing expected litigation 
costs41 and dynamic benefits in the form of increased R&D for rela-
tively stronger inventions.42 However, in some instances there may be 
deviations from the standard assumptions used to derive these results, 
which could make some RPSs pro-competitive.43 For instance, when 
G is liquidity-constrained, an RPS may be necessary for the firm to 
survive financially until it enters the market.44 Absent such deviations 
from standard assumptions, RPSs ought to be prevented. Appropriate 
restriction can be achieved by applying the rule of reason to allow 
RPSs only when there is clear indication that the settlement would 
further pro-competitive goals.45 
                                                                                                                  
36. See infra Part IV.C, for a model of delayed entry settlements. 
37. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2012) vacated; Gratz, 
supra note 33, at 9. 
38. See infra Part V.C. 
39. Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley make a similar point. Supra note 6, at 1760–61. See in-
fra, Part V.D, for a detailed discussion of the effect of relative over-optimism. It demon-
strates that accounting for potential over-optimism magnifies the reward shifting effect of 
illegalizing RPSs by increasing litigation costs for weak patents and reducing litigation costs 
for strong patents. 
40. K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218. This Article follows the Third Circuit in labeling these cir-
cumstances as probably rare. Id. (labeling as “probably rare” the “situations where a reverse 
payment increases competition”). Whether or not these circumstances are in fact rare, as an 
empirical matter, is not a question that this Article addresses. 
41. This is true as long as parties are not over-optimistic. Over-optimism might lead to 
increased litigation costs, but it also strengthens the reward shifting result presented in the 
Article. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; infra Part V.D. 
42. See infra Part V. 
43. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
44. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
45. In K-Dur, the Third Circuit advocated a “quick look rule of reason analysis,” which 
makes RPSs presumptively illegal. 686 F.3d at 218. Figuring out the precise quickness with 
which the rule of reason ought to be applied is not an easy task. As the Supreme Court stat-
ed, “there is generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give rise to an 
intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed 
treatment. What is required . . . is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstanc-
es, details, and logic of a restraint.” Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780–81 (1999). 
Although a single article cannot provide a complete answer as to how quickly the rule of 
reason ought to be applied, one can identify relevant factors. This Article shows that what 
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It should be noted that, just like any economic model, the game-
theoretic model presented in Parts IV and V abstracts from potentially 
relevant issues.46 Thus, this Article does not purport to address every 
relevant aspect of restricting RPSs. Instead, it serves a less ambitious 
goal, namely to identify a previously unnoticed and positive effect of 
restricting RPSs.  
The remaining parts of this Article are devoted to more precisely 
presenting the arguments outlined above, particularly through the use 
of a game-theoretical model. Part II presents the regulatory frame-
work under which RPSs take place and explains the tests used by each 
of the five circuit courts that have decided RPS cases in the past. It 
also examines how the circuit courts that have treated RPSs permis-
sively relied on the assumption that RPSs foster innovation. Finally, it 
briefly reviews the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis. Part 
III reviews reward theory, the dominant utilitarian approach to study-
ing patent law, and introduces and defines the concept of “probabilis-
tic patents.” It also documents the peculiar features of the 
pharmaceutical sector and describes why these features may make 
reward theory particularly suitable for analyzing companies’ incen-
tives in this sector. Part IV reviews the economics literature on set-
tlements, which provides the necessary analytical framework to 
evaluate the relevant parties’ incentives to engage in DESs. Part V 
uses the insights and analytical tools introduced in Parts III and IV to 
structure a game-theoretical model of R&D and settlement.  
Part V further demonstrates that illegalizing RPSs can foster 
technological progress by giving potential inventors greater incentives 
to engage in strong R&D, and later discusses the effect of relaxing 
some of the assumptions employed in the game-theoretical model. 
Part VI concludes by discussing directions for future research. 
                                                                                                                  
courts and scholars previously interpreted as a dynamic cost may in fact be a dynamic bene-
fit. 
46. For instance, the model abstracts from the issue of at-risk entry recently addressed by 
Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 6, the incentive distortion effect of the 180-day exclusivity 
period addressed by Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 11. Rather it focuses on the interac-
tions between a patentee and a single generic entrant. There is no reason to believe, a priori, 
that including these details in the model presented in Parts IV and V is likely to diminish the 
magnitude of the reward shifting effect; to the contrary, it may magnify the effect. See infra 
Parts IV, V. The one natural extension of the model studied in this Article, for instance, 
analyzes the effect of parties’ imperfect information regarding trial outcomes and reveals 
that the reward shifting effect is likely to be magnified. Further research is necessary to 
determine the effects of these factors. 
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II. REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND EXISTING LAW 
A. Reverse Payment Settlements 
An RPS is an agreement between a patentee and an alleged patent 
infringer, whereby the patentee pays the alleged infringer to delay 
entry into the market for a certain period of time. The atypical direc-
tion of the settlement payment, namely from patentee to infringer ra-
ther than from infringer to patentee, is why the word “reverse” is used 
to describe the settlement.47 Two questions should immediately come 
to mind: If the patentee is the owner of a legitimate patent, why would 
it settle with an alleged infringer instead of enforcing the legitimacy 
of its patent through ligation? Conversely, if the alleged patent in-
fringer believes that the patent is invalid, why would it forego profits 
by settling instead of entering the market? 
These questions are most relevant and thoroughly debated regard-
ing the use of RPSs in the pharmaceutical sector. The majority of anti-
trust challenges to RPSs occur in the context of generic drug 
companies’ challenges of branded drug patents.48 To put the discus-
sion of RPSs and pharmaceuticals into perspective, it will be helpful 
to understand the regulatory and statutory framework that is the impe-
tus for such agreements, i.e., the Hatch-Waxman Act, and its relation 
to the Food and Drug Administration’s process of approving generic 
drugs.49 
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act and ANDAs 
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, no prescription 
drug can be marketed prior to gaining approval from the FDA.50 The 
applicant seeking drug approval files a New Drug Application 
(“NDA”),51 which requires the applicant undergo multiple phases of 
                                                                                                                  
47. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 205 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(explaining why the word “reverse” is used to describe such payments). 
48. See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Anti-
trust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494 (2007) (“Because of 
the huge drop in drug price that occurs when such patent challenges succeed and the atypi-
cal direction of payment flow, these settlements have garnered much interest from the FTC 
and others.”). 
49. Opderbeck, supra note 11, contains an excellent review of the regulatory framework 
generated by the Hatch-Waxman Act, to which the Author extensively referred. See discus-
sion infra Part II.B.  
50. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). 
51. Id. § 355(b)(1). The NDA must contain detailed information about the drug, includ-
ing its “composition,” “full reports of investigations” about its safety and effectiveness, “a 
full description” of its production and packing processes, and “specimens of the labeling 
proposed to be used.” Id. 
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clinical trials,52 a process that is both time-intensive and extremely 
costly.53 If the FDA approves the NDA, it publishes the drug and pa-
tent information in a book54 commonly referred to as the “Orange 
Book.”55 
Before the HWA, the end result of the approval process was usu-
ally for the drug to reach the market with a short period of time left on 
the original patent.56 However, potential competitors could not legally 
develop generic versions of branded pharmaceuticals to be launched 
upon patent expiration unless they met a statutory exception to the 
Patent Act.57 
The HWA altered the regulatory context of these policies for 
pharmaceuticals. Specifically, the HWA provided an extension for up 
to five years on drug patents that were subject to regulatory delay.58 
The Act helps generic competitors as well, however, by allowing 
them to seek regulatory approval without incurring patent liability.59 
More importantly, the Act also allows a generic competitor to seek an 
ANDA if it can be shown that the generic drug is the “bioequivalent” 
of a patented drug.60 The ANDA allows an applicant to piggyback on 
the safety and efficacy studies of a patented drug, thereby reducing 
regulatory costs to generic competitors.61 
An ANDA “must make one of four ‘paragraph certifications’” re-
garding the patent for the branded drug.62 Under “Paragraph I,” the 
generic company certifies that no patent information for the brand 
name drug has been filed with the FDA.63 For a “Paragraph II” certifi-
                                                                                                                  
52. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its Impact on the 
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 192–93 (1999).  
53. See Bret Dickey, Jonathan Orszag & Laura Tyson, An Economic Assessment of Pa-
tent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 369 (2010) 
(noting evidence that, on average, new drugs take between ten and fifteen years and cost 
more than $1.3 billion to develop); Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. 
Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (estimating the “fully capitalized” cost of developing a new 
drug at $802 million); Salomeh Keyhani, Marie Diener-West & Neil Powe, Are Develop-
ment Times for Pharmaceuticals Increasing or Decreasing?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 461, 463 
(2006) (finding that the median clinical trial phase for drug development is 5.1 years).  
54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A) (2012). 
55. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 11, at 951–52 (“Those patents are listed by the 
brand-name firm in an FDA document commonly known as the Orange Book.”). 
56. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: 
AN FTC STUDY 4 (July 2002), http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/www.ftc. 
gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (“[T]he effective terms of many patents were short-
ened due to the time required for the FDA to ensure the safety and efficacy of the brand-
name company’s drug product.”). 
57. Opderbeck, supra note 11, at 1306. 
58. 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(c)(3), (g)(6)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
59. Opderbeck, supra note 11, at 1307. 
60. See 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012). 
61. Opderbeck, supra note 11, at 1307. 
62. FTC v. Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012). 
63. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I) (2012). 
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cation, the generic company must show that the patent for the branded 
drug has expired.64 Under “Paragraph III,” the applicant must demon-
strate that a patent will terminate on a certain date,65 and the FDA 
then places the application on hold until that expiration date.66 Of 
greatest import, however, are the incentives for potential generic 
competitors to challenge drug patents before they expire, which hap-
pens under a “Paragraph IV” certification. Under Paragraph IV, an 
applicant certifies that the challenged patent “is invalid or will not be 
infringed by” the generic version of the drug.67 The first filer of a Par-
agraph IV certification receives a 180-day period of generic market 
exclusivity.68 
Under Paragraph IV, the applicant must provide notice to the 
pharmaceutical company of its challenge to the branded drug’s pa-
tent,69 after which the challenged pharmaceutical company has 45 
days to respond by filing an infringement lawsuit against the ANDA 
applicant.70 If the patent holder fails to sue, the FDA proceeds with its 
approval of the generic drug.71 However, if the suit is timely filed, the 
FDA delays approval for 30 months to allow resolution through litiga-
tion or settlement.72 
The typical RPS under Hatch-Waxman occurs when a generic 
manufacturer files an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification, and 
settles the subsequent lawsuit by agreeing to delay marketing a gener-
ic version of the drug in exchange for a monetary payment from the 
branded manufacturer.73 
C. Litigation Involving Reverse Payment Settlements 
The circuit courts of appeals have applied different sets of rules to 
determine the legality of RPSs, which has led to conflicting results. 
Six circuit courts have evaluated various types of RPSs: the Second, 
                                                                                                                  
64. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II). 
65. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III). 
66. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii). 
67. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
68. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 11, at 953. The model in Parts IV and V does not 
formally incorporate the 180-day exclusivity period to focus on the reward shifting effect of 
illegalizing RPSs, which is discussed in Part V. See infra Parts IV, V. The effects of this 
exclusivity period, and potential reforms, are discussed in detail in Hemphill & Lemley, 
supra note 11. 
69. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2012).  
70. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
71. Id. 
72. Id.  
73. See, e.g., Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharma-
ceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 
191 (2008); Holman, supra note 48, at 494–500. 
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Third, Sixth, Eleventh, Federal, and D.C. Circuits.74 Only four of the-
se circuits analyzed typical RPSs, where the agreement settles the un-
derlying infringement case.75 Among these circuits, only the Third 
Circuit’s rule can fairly be characterized as one that restricts the use of 
typical RPSs.76 The three circuits that applied permissive rules to 
evaluate RPSs — the Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit, and, indi-
rectly and to a lesser extent, the Federal Circuit — relied on the as-
sumption that allowing RPSs would foster innovation.77 The 
divergence between these Circuits’ approaches and the Third Circuit’s 
approach led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in an Eleventh Cir-
cuit case, and subsequently to decide that courts must apply the rule of 
reason when considering antitrust challenges to RPSs.78 To highlight 
how the assumption that RPSs increase R&D incentives have contrib-
uted to these developments, and to describe the split between the cir-
cuit courts in further detail, this Article briefly reviews important 
aspects of the Second, Third, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits’ deci-
sions. Then, this Article describes the recent Supreme Court decision 
in FTC v. Actavis.  
                                                                                                                  
74. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 209–14 (3d Cir. 2012) (listing prior circuit 
court decisions concerning RPSs). 
75. Id. at 210–11 (explaining that the D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit analyzed the 
same RPS, and that the RPS did not settle the underlying patent infringement). 
76. See id. at 218. 
77. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Rules se-
verely restricting patent settlements might also be contrary to the goals of the patent laws 
because the increased number of continuing lawsuits that would result would heighten the 
uncertainty surrounding patents and might delay innovation.”); Schering-Plough Corp. v. 
FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that restricting RPSs “may actually 
decrease product innovation by amplifying the period of uncertainty around the drug manu-
facturer’s ability to research, develop, and market the patented product or allegedly infring-
ing product”). The Federal Circuit relied on the district court’s analysis of the “tension 
between the antitrust laws and the patent laws” in concluding that only anti-competitive 
effects outside “the exclusionary zone” ought to be taken into account when applying the 
rule of reason. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). The district court, in turn, referred to a previous case where the court 
pointed out that illegalizing RPS may retard innovation. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 532 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hy-
drochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)) (“Moreover, a rule 
that makes it per se illegal to settle a Hatch-Waxman lawsuit, like the Bayer/Barr patent 
litigation, limits the options available to both generic and brand-name manufacturers. If 
brand-name manufacturers are unable to control or limit their risk by settling Hatch-
Waxman litigation, they, like generic manufacturers, may be less inclined to invest the 
research and development (‘R & D’) costs associated with bringing new drugs to the mar-
ket. The pharmaceutical industry depends greatly on R&D and the economic returns to 
intellectual property created when a successful new drug is brought to market.”). 
78. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., No. 12-416, slip op. at 20–21 (U.S. June 17, 2013).  
14  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 27 
 
1. Reliance by the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits on the 
Assumption that RPSs Increase R&D Incentives 
The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuit courts all applied per-
missive rules when evaluating the legality of RPSs, as the existence 
and amount of the reverse payment played no role in their analysis of 
RPSs. In fact, according to K-Dur, “[a]s a practical matter, the scope 
of the patent test does not subject reverse payment agreements to any 
antitrust scrutiny. As the antitrust defendants concede, no court apply-
ing the scope of the patent test has ever permitted a reverse payment 
antitrust case to go to trial.”79 All three courts relied on the assump-
tion that allowing RPSs fosters innovation. Though the Federal Cir-
cuit’s reliance was rather indirect, the Second and Eleventh Circuits’ 
reliance on this assumption was very explicit. 
In In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, the Second Circuit 
reasoned that restricting RPSs would generate “uncertainty surround-
ing patents and might delay innovation.”80 Similarly, in Schering-
Plough Corp. v. FTC, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that “the caustic 
environment of patent litigation may actually decrease product inno-
vation.”81 The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, relied on the lower 
court’s analysis of the “tension between the antitrust laws and the pa-
tent laws” in concluding that only anti-competitive effects outside 
“the exclusionary zone” ought to be taken into account when applying 
the rule of reason.82 Yet the lower court, in turn, had relied on the rea-
soning that illegalizing RPSs would “limit[] the options available to 
both generic and brand-name manufacturers,” and that this would in-
duce branded and generic manufacturers alike to “be less inclined to 
invest the research and development (‘R & D’) costs associated with 
bringing new drugs to the market.”83  
It is impossible to ascertain how much these courts relied on the 
alleged R&D-reducing effect of illegalizing RPSs, or whether they 
would have decided differently had they observed the reward shifting 
effect of illegalizing RPSs. It is certain, however, that one cannot lend 
as much credibility to their opinions after observing the reward shift-
ing effect, since any analysis purporting to address the “tension be-
tween the antitrust laws and the patent laws”84 must carefully consider 
how various rules affect the expected rewards to potential patentees. 
This is true not only because “the constitutional provision upon which 
the copyright and patent statutes rest indicates that the purpose of 
                                                                                                                  
79. K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214. 
80. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 203. 
81. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1075. 
82. Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1333. 
83. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 532 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).  
84. Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1333. 
No. 1] Reverse Payments, Perverse Incentives 15 
 
those laws is to provide incentives for creative intellectual efforts that 
will benefit the society at large,”85 but also because courts display a 
desire to provide proper R&D incentives.86 
2. The Third Circuit 
In In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, the Third Circuit considered 
the RPSs between Schering-Plough and two generic drug manufactur-
ers, Upsher and ESI.87 Those two agreements had been reviewed pre-
viously by the Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC.88 
After reviewing previous RPS cases decided by other circuit 
courts, the court refused to apply the “scope of the patent test”89 pre-
viously used by the Eleventh and Second Circuits because the “test 
improperly restricts the application of antitrust law and is contrary to 
the policies underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act and a long line of Su-
preme Court precedent on patent litigation and competition.”90 The 
Third Circuit emphasized that the scope of the patent test creates an 
“almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity.”91 After citing 
studies that provide empirical support for the proposition that “[m]any 
patents issued by the PTO are later found to be invalid or not in-
fringed,”92 the court focused on the dangers and costs associated with 
enforcing weak patents, and concluded that “the public interest sup-
ports judicial testing and elimination of weak patents.”93 Finally, the 
court supported this conclusion by turning to Supreme Court prece-
dent on the issue. Specifically, the court cited to Edward Katzinger 
Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co., a case in which the Su-
preme Court emphasized “the broad public interest in freeing our 
competitive economy from the trade restraints which might be im-
posed by price-fixing agreements stemming from narrow or invalid 
patents.”94 
After rejecting the scope of the patent test, the court adopted a 
quick look rule of reason test, which creates a rebuttable presumption 
of illegality upon a showing that the patentee made a payment to the 
                                                                                                                  
85. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 173 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
86. See supra note 7; Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1075 (“[W]e must recognize ‘[a] 
suitable accommodation between antitrust law’s free competition requirement and the patent 
regime’s incentive system.’” (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 
1294, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003))). 
87. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2012). 
88. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1058.  
89. K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 212. 
90. Id. at 214. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 215. 
93. Id.  
94. 329 U.S. 394, 400 (1947). 
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generic manufacturer who agreed to delay entry.95 The court support-
ed its decision by emphasizing that parties’ incentives to settle would 
be preserved to a great extent because they could still agree on settle-
ments that only involve delayed entry by the generic manufacturer but 
no reverse payment.96 This rule, according to the court, would elimi-
nate anticompetitive behavior without threatening most settlements.97 
3. The Supreme Court 
In FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, the Eleventh Circuit did not 
depart from the test it previously promulgated in Schering-Plough 
Corp. v. FTC, explaining that “absent sham litigation or fraud in ob-
taining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from anti-
trust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope 
of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”98 After applying this test 
to the RPSs between branded manufacturer Solvay and its generic 
competitors, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision 
to dismiss the FTC’s claim.99 The FTC appealed the decision and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of “[w]hether re-
verse-payment agreements are per se lawful unless the underlying 
patent litigation was a sham or the patent was obtained by fraud (as 
the court below held), or instead are presumptively anticompetitive 
and unlawful (as the Third Circuit has held).”100 
In FTC v. Actavis, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of 
the Eleventh Circuit and held that the rule-of-reason must be applied 
to determine the validity of RPSs.101 In coming to the conclusion that 
it should not grant “near-automatic antitrust immunity to [RPSs],” the 
Supreme Court made a number of observations, summarized as fol-
lows: 
[An RPS] can bring with it the risk of significant an-
ticompetitive effects; one who makes such a pay-
ment may be unable to explain and to justify it; such 
a firm or individual may well possess market power 
derived from the patent; a court, by examining the 
size of the payment, may well be able to assess its 
likely anticompetitive effects along with its potential 
justifications without litigating the validity of the pa-
                                                                                                                  
95. K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218. 
96. Id. at 217–18. 
97. Id. at 218. 
98. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012).  
99. Id. at 1315. 
100. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at (I). 
101. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., No. 12-416, slip op. at 21 (U.S. June 17, 2013).  
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tent; and parties may well find ways to settle patent 
disputes without the use of reverse payments.102 
The Court similarly refused “to hold that reverse payment settle-
ment agreements are presumptively unlawful,”103 because this would 
be appropriate only when “an observer with even a rudimentary un-
derstanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in 
question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and mar-
kets.”104  
Most relatedly to the observations made in this Article, in ex-
plaining its rationale, the Supreme Court noted that an issued patent 
“may or may not be valid,” and similarly that it “may or may not be 
infringed.”105 Therefore, “it would be incongruous to determine anti-
trust legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects 
solely against patent law policy, rather than by measuring them 
against procompetitive antitrust policies as well.”106 Hence, just like 
the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the Supreme Court focused on 
striking a balance between the dynamic efficiency objectives of patent 
law and static efficiency objectives of antitrust law.  
Contrary to claims by the Second and Eleventh Circuits, this Arti-
cle demonstrates that RPSs may be retarding, rather than promoting, 
technological progress by shifting rewards from strong inventions 
towards weak inventions. Therefore, to serve the Supreme Court’s 
stated objective of balancing static benefits and dynamic costs, lower 
courts must hesitate to draw broad conclusions regarding the costs of 
precluding RPSs when applying the rule of reason in the future.  
III. UTILITY OF PATENTS, REWARD THEORY AND ITS 
APPLICATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR, AND 
PROBABILISTIC PATENTS 
This Article focuses on utilitarian theories of patents.107 Known 
as a moral theory,108 utilitarianism is the dominant approach courts 
                                                                                                                  
102. Id. at 19–20. 
103. Id. at 20. 
104. Id. (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)). 
105. Id. at 8. 
106. Id. at 8–9. 
107. For a discussion of utilitarian theories of patents, see Fisher, supra note 85, at 177. 
108. Unlike non-welfarist assessments, utilitarianism satisfies the Pareto principle, mean-
ing that if there are two potential outcomes, A and B, where A provides greater utility to 
each individual in society, it ranks A higher than B. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, 109 J. POL. 
ECON. 281 (2001). For a lengthy and technical discussion of utilitarianism as a theory of 
distributive justice, see JOHN ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 127–62 (1996). 
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use to evaluate the social desirability of competing antitrust rules109 
and is “the principal philosophical theory”110 used to study intellectual 
property rights.111 
Within the utilitarian approach to intellectual property, there are 
several competing and complementary theories.112 The most promi-
nent are reward theory,113 prospect theory,114 and commercialization 
theory.115 These theories have in common the normative goal of max-
imizing social welfare. However, they diverge in their assessments of 
how to achieve this normative goal, which economic tradeoffs are 
fundamental, and which patent functions deserve the greatest empha-
sis. Of these three theories, reward theory is the most commonly ap-
plied,116 either explicitly or implicitly, to study the desirability of 
various features of the patent system. For instance, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, in FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc.,117 which eventually reached the 
Supreme Court, appeared to be applying reward theory in its opening 
paragraph.118 The remainder of this Part discusses the details of vari-
ous utilitarian theories as well as the probabilistic nature of patents’ 
ability to exclude. 
                                                                                                                  
109. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed 
the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”). 
110. Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 129, 130 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (“Not 
surprisingly, the principal philosophical theory applied to the protection of utilitarian 
works — that is, technological inventions — has been utilitarianism.”) (citation omitted); 
see also Fisher, supra note 85, at 169. 
111. Other, non-utilitarian theories of intellectual property described in Fisher, supra note 
85, at 170–72, include: (1) the Lockean approach, which stems from the idea that people 
who add value, through their labor, to previously unclaimed resources are entitled to the 
products of their labor, (2) the Kantian/Hegelian approach, which suggests that property 
rights ought to be allocated to enable individuals to fulfill primary human needs, including 
creativity, and (3) a version of legal realism, which focuses on “foster[ing] the achievement 
of a just and attractive culture.” 
112. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor 2 (Stanford Public Law Work-
ing Paper, No. 1856610, July 21, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1856610 (reviewing competing utilitarian theories). 
113. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 305, 310–13 (1992) (providing a brief review of the historical developments in reward 
theory, and distinguishing between the strong and weak forms of reward theory); infra Part 
III.A. 
114. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing prospect theory in further detail). 
115. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing commercialization theory in further detail). 
116. Fisher, supra note 85, at 178. 
117. 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012). 
118. Id. at 1300 “Only one in every 5,000 medicines tested for the potential to treat ill-
ness is eventually approved for patient use, and studies estimate that developing a new drug 
takes 10 to 15 years and costs more than $1.3 billion. No rational actor would take that kind 
of a risk over that period of time without the prospect of a big reward. The reward, if any, 
comes when the drug is approved and patented, giving the pioneer or ‘brand name’ compa-
ny that developed it a monopoly over the sale of the new drug for the life of the patent. The 
pioneer company can then exploit the patent monopoly by charging higher prices than it 
could if competitors were allowed to sell bioequivalent or ‘generic’ versions of the drug.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
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A. Reward Theory 
Reward theory posits that the primary reason for issuing patents is 
to provide incentives to potential inventors to engage in R&D activity. 
Without patents, as Judge Posner observes, the fundamental economic 
problem is that “the manufacturer will not make the invention in the 
first place; he won’t sow if he won’t be able to reap.”119 The benefit of 
a patent from this perspective, then, is the dynamic incentive to inno-
vate, which in turn fuels economic growth. 
There are also well-known social costs associated with the patent 
system. The primary cost arises from the patentees’ ability to prevent 
others from legally making, using, or selling the patented product. 
This confers a degree of market power on patentees by limiting com-
petition, which increases deadweight loss. Economists and legal 
scholars have long struggled to strike a balance between the compet-
ing goals of reducing such costs and increasing overall R&D activi-
ty.120 
Early works focusing on these competing goals have identified 
various instruments that can influence the associated costs and bene-
fits. Most notably, increasing the duration of patents is hypothesized 
to increase R&D activity by making the prize to potential patentees 
larger. Lengthening patent duration, however, also comes at the pre-
viously mentioned social cost of conferring additional market power 
to the patentees. This use-creation tradeoff121 is the focal point of a 
great deal of patent research.122 It has been applied to study the opti-
mal duration123 and breadth of patents,124 as well as the desirability of 
various aspects of patent regimes, including the independent invention 
                                                                                                                  
119. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 48 (8th ed. 2011). 
120. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A 
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 88–89 (1969); Richard Gilbert & 
Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (2010) (studying 
the optimal patent duration, and more generally optimal patent structure, by focusing on the 
tradeoffs between innovation and deadweight loss). 
121. The use-creation tradeoff refers to “the inevitable production of dead-weight loss in 
the ex post market for the invention for the purpose of fostering technological progress.” 
Murat C. Mungan, Less Protection, More Innovation?, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcom-
ing) (manuscript at 10), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1865949. 
122. See, e.g., Emeric Henry, Runner-up Patents: Is Monopoly Inevitable?, 112 
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 417 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require 
Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007); Murat C. Mungan, Economics of the 
Independent Invention Defense Under Incomplete Information, 20 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183 
(2012); Shapiro, supra note 18. 
123. See, e.g., Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 120; Nordhaus, supra note 120, at 76–86.  
124. See, e.g., Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 120; Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should 
the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990). 
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defense,125 runner-up patents,126 prior user rights,127 and probabilistic 
enforcement of patents.128 
Reward theory has been criticized for drawing an incomplete pic-
ture of the patent system. The simplest form of reward theory does not 
account for the fact that broad patents on complementary technolo-
gies, each necessary for a new product, may lead to hold-up prob-
lems.129 Moreover, while reward theory suggests that increasing the 
reward to becoming a patentee necessarily leads to faster technologi-
cal progress,130 there are some recent empirical studies that suggest 
otherwise: namely that stronger patent protection may not stimulate 
innovation.131 
A more detailed survey of the existing empirical work on patents 
and innovation reveals a peculiar characteristic of R&D in the phar-
maceutical sector. Specifically, decision makers in the pharmaceutical 
sector appear to be most affected by the availability and strength of 
patents, with many claiming that they would not have developed a 
new product if patent protections were not available.132  
                                                                                                                  
125. See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention De-
fence in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002); Mungan, supra note 121, at 2; 
Mungan supra note 122; Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent 
Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006). 
126. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 122.  
127. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 18. 
128. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 75 (2005). 
129. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard 
Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 604 (2007) (“We discuss the risk of 
hold-up when standard-setting organizations (SSOs) include patented technology in stand-
ards. We focus on the mechanism of, and techniques for avoiding, inefficient patent hold-
up.”) Similarly broad patents can retard technological progress by blocking secondary in-
ventors from using the patented technology for the invention of a newer technology. A 
cumulative invention framework can be used to account for this possibility. See Suzanne 
Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).  
130. See Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the 
Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531, 545 (2000) (“[A] generalized increase in patent 
breadth or scope, holding all else equal, unambiguously increases the innovation rate, be-
cause it does not affect the incentives of subsequent potentially infringing inventors.”). But 
see Mungan, supra note 121 (showing that if coordination effects are considered, theoreti-
cally, more protection can lead to less innovation). 
131. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 473, 499–500, 502 (2005) (reviewing empirical studies to support the proposition that 
“patent law may not stimulate R&D as directly as assumed by conventional incentive theo-
ries”); Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation? 
Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms, 32 RAND J. ECON. 77, 77 (2001) 
(finding “no evidence of an increase in either R&D spending or innovative output” attribut-
able to increased patent scope). 
132. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectu-
al Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, Feb. 2000), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552. 
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This interesting fact can be explained by the “discrete”133 nature 
of most technologies in the pharmaceutical sector, which is described 
by the well-known study by Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh134: 
[T]he key difference between a complex and a dis-
crete technology is whether a new, commercializable 
product or process is comprised of numerous sepa-
rately patentable elements versus relatively few. 
New drugs or chemicals typically are comprised of a 
relatively discrete number of patentable elements. In 
contrast, electronic products tend to be comprised of 
a larger number — often hundreds — of patentable 
elements and, hence, may be characterized as com-
plex. 
Given the discrete nature of most products in the pharmaceutical 
industry, applying reward theory in this context appears to be less 
problematic than applying it in other industries. This is likely why 
most studies and court opinions analyzing the desirability of RPSs 
focus, either implicitly or explicitly, on the reward theory of patents. 
B. Other Utilitarian Theories of Patents 
1. Prospect Theory 
Edmund Kitch first developed the prospect theory in 1977.135 
This theory “conceives of the process of technological innovation as 
one in which resources are brought to bear upon an array of pro-
spects.”136 According to Kitch, granting broad patent rights enables 
patentees to coordinate research efforts that build upon the initially 
patented technology, incentivizing them to “further develop the 
field.”137 In addition to increasing overall output, such coordination is 
socially desirable because it eliminates rent-seeking and thus, poten-
tially excessive development costs by third parties.138 
                                                                                                                  
133. Id. at 19; see also Don E. Kash & William Kingston, Patents in a World of Complex 
Technologies, 28 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 12 (2001) (distinguishing between complex and 
simple technologies); Ken Kusunoki et al., Organizational Capabilities in Product Devel-
opment of Japanese Firms: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Findings, 9 Org. Sci. 
699 (1998). 
134. Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, supra note 132, at 19. 
135. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265 (1977).  
136. Id. at 266. 
137. Lemley, supra note 112, at 60. 
138. See POSNER, supra note 119, at 48–49 (providing a brief review of how patent law 
mitigates rent-seeking). 
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Kitch supports his arguments by analogizing the patent system to 
the mineral claims system, which “permitted one who found minerali-
zation on the public land to file a claim which gave him the exclusive 
right to develop the claim.”139 According to Kitch, this system in-
creased mineral output by incentivizing “prospectors to pack their 
burros and walk off into the desert in search of mineralization.”140 
Mark Lemley contests the empirical accuracy of Kitch’s analo-
gy.141 Lemley contends that one of the primary purported benefits 
identified by prospect theory does not exist. Unlike the mineral claims 
case, the historical “evidence suggests that strong patent control sig-
nificantly impedes both commercialization and improvement of new 
technologies.”142 Kitch’s framework also fails to recognize well-
known costs associated with strong patents. In particular, granting 
strong patents runs the risk of retarding technological progress by dis-
couraging other firms from developing technologies that build on the 
patented invention.143 While this may eliminate rent-seeking efforts 
for such secondary inventions, it may increase rent-seeking activity 
for the initial invention. In light of these observations, scholars have 
criticized prospect theory as inconsistent with the realities of innova-
tion.144 
The dispute over whether Kitch’s mineral claims analogy is mis-
placed is unlikely to be settled by a single article. It appears that the 
applicability of prospect theory depends on the inventive process be-
ing relatively complex, rather than discrete, because it relies on R&D 
resources to be “brought to bear upon an array of prospects.”145 Given 
that the pharmaceutical industry involves relatively discrete technolo-
gies,146 abstracting from issues related to prospect theory may be less 
harmful than it would be in other industries. However, because there 
are not sufficient empirical analyses focusing on the topic, it is impos-
sible to make definite statements about the importance and relevance 
of prospect theory related considerations in the pharmaceutical sector. 
2. Commercialization Theory 
Commercialization is “the transformation of an innovative or cre-
ative idea or design (be it patentable or copyrightable) into a commer-
cially viable product or method that some end-user can actually put 
                                                                                                                  
139. Kitch, supra note 135, at 271. 
140. Id. at 274. 
141. See Lemley, supra note 112, at 59–74. 
142. Id. at 73–74. 
143. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871–79 (1990). 
144. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 112, at 2; Merges & Nelson, supra note 143, at 872. 
145. Kitch, supra note 135, at 266. 
146. See Kash & Kingston, supra note 133, at 13 and accompanying text. 
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into practice.”147 Theories focusing on commercialization stress that 
an individual’s incentive to invent may diverge from her incentive to 
commercialize the invention. As evidence of such divergence, schol-
ars point out that a large number of patented inventions are not com-
mercialized.148 
Michael Abramowicz asserts that patentees may choose not to 
commercialize their inventions if their patents are sufficiently close to 
expiring at the time commercialization becomes “potentially attrac-
tive.”149 Likewise, empirical evidence suggests that “being refused a 
patent reduces the likelihood of commercialization.”150 Thus, under-
commercialization and underdevelopment of products may emerge as 
potential problems, which essentially eliminate products from the 
market. To solve such problems, commercialization scholars have 
proposed somewhat unorthodox methods. Abramowicz and Duffy, for 
instance, argue that commercialization difficulty ought to be a factor 
in determining patentability.151 Similarly, Ted Sichelman suggests that 
“commercialization patents,” in addition to traditional patents, ought 
to be awarded to incentivize interested parties to develop existing in-
ventions further.152 
Mark Lemley, on the other hand, suggests that “commercializa-
tion theory [does not] offer a reason to grant broad patent rights to an 
inventor [when] the patent wasn’t necessary to induce the inven-
tion.”153 Lemley’s criticism focuses upon the empirical observation 
that “[o]rdinary economic rents, coupled with non-patent advantages 
such as first-mover benefits and brand reputation, have long proved 
sufficient to encourage entry into new markets even in the absence of 
patent protection.”154 
Unsurprisingly, there is no consensus as to whether under-
commercialization is a real and significant problem in general and it is 
unclear whether Lemley’s criticisms are particularly relevant in the 
pharmaceutical sector.155 Fortunately, for purposes of studying RPSs, 
an answer to a much narrower question is required: Is under-
                                                                                                                  
147. Ted Sichelman, Taking Commercialisation Seriously, 33 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
200, 200 (2011). 
148. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 341 (2010) 
(“About half, probably more, of all patented inventions in the United States are never com-
mercially exploited.”). 
149. Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1065 (2007). 
150. Elizabeth Webster & Paul H. Jensen, Do Patents Matter for Commercialization?, 54 
J.L. ECON. 431, 447 (2011). 
151. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimen-
tation, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 337, 395–408 (2008). 
152. Sichelman, supra note 148, at 346. 
153. Lemley, supra note 112, at 62. 
154. Id. at 63. 
155. See Webster & Jensen, supra note 150, at 447, for an empirical discussion of 
whether patents have an effect on commercialization. 
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commercialization a significant problem in the pharmaceutical sector? 
There is at least some empirical evidence that supports a negative an-
swer. At least one study found that in the pharmaceutical sector there 
is little variation between the proportion of inventions that would not 
have been developed and the proportion of inventions that would not 
have been commercialized if patent protection could not have been 
obtained.156 
Given the lack of sophisticated and comprehensive studies on the 
relevance of commercialization theory or prospect theory, it is cur-
rently not possible to determine the precise importance of exclusively 
focusing on reward theory. Therefore, this Article must be interpreted 
as providing a benchmark model focusing on reward theory, which 
can in future research be extended to include considerations of com-
mercialization and prospect theories. 
C. Probabilistic Patents: Weak Patents v. Strong Patents 
Many scholars tend to consider only hypothetical and idealized 
patents when discussing the optimality of competing patent policies. 
An idealized “ironclad” patent157 gives the patentee the right and abil-
ity to stop others from making, using, or selling the patentee’s inven-
tion with certainty. Real-world patents, however, are far less valuable 
than ironclad patents.158 The likelihood that an ordinary patent, once 
challenged, will be found to be partially or entirely invalid is far from 
zero. In fact, “[o]f patents litigated to a final determination (appeal, 
trial, or summary judgment), 46 percent are held invalid.”159 
In applying reward theory to study the desirability of RPSs, it is 
crucial to realize that patents confer the “right to try to exclude,” ra-
ther than “the [absolute] right to exclude,”160 because a patentee’s 
confidence in settlement negotiations will crucially depend on how 
likely it thinks it will be able to exclude. To incorporate this aspect, 
this Article considers “probabilistic patents”161 rather than ironclad 
patents. When a patentee who holds a probabilistic patent sues another 
                                                                                                                  
156. Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 
175 (1986) (reporting that of all developed or commercially introduced inventions in the 
pharmaceuticals industry between 1981 and 1983, 65% would not have been commercially 
introduced, and 60% would not have been developed, if patent protection could not be ob-
tained). 
157. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 395 
(2003). 
158. Id. (“[A]ll real patents are less strong than the idealized patent grant usually imag-
ined in economic theory.”). 
159. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 128, at 80 (2005) (internal citation omitted). It should 
be noted that this number may not accurately reflect the probability with which the average 
patent would be found invalid. It only demonstrates that invalidity is a real possibility for 
litigated patents. 
160. See Shapiro, supra note 157, at 395. 
161. This refers to the title of Lemley & Shapiro’s article, supra note 128. 
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party for infringement, the court may determine that the patent is in-
valid or not infringed. This Article refers to a patent as “weak” if the 
probability of either event is high and “strong” if the probability of 
both is low. 
The strength of a patent not only affects the patentee’s incentives 
to sue or settle, it also provides information as to the social value of 
the invention for which the patent was granted. A rational patentee 
holding a weak patent, ceteris paribus, would be willing to pay a great 
price to avoid revealing the invalidity or non-infringement of its pa-
tent through litigation.162 Moreover, patents granted for relatively ob-
vious or relatively less novel inventions are weaker because they are 
more likely to be found invalid if challenged. These inventions, ceter-
is paribus, contribute less to social welfare than those protected by 
strong patents because they represent smaller technological advances. 
Therefore, it is plausible to assume that a legal regime that induces 
less R&D in weakly patentable inventions and more R&D in strongly 
patentable inventions will tend to increase social welfare. 
In short, recognizing that not all patents have the same strength is 
imperative to understanding that restrictions on RPSs may (1) affect 
parties’ litigation and settlement incentives differently based on the 
strength of the patent, (2) affect potential inventors’ R&D efforts dif-
ferently depending on the obviousness or novelty of the potential in-
vention, and (3) affect the aggregate value of inventions obtained 
through R&D by shifting rewards from weakly patentable to strongly 
patentable inventions. Next, this Article reviews the economics litera-
ture on settlements to analyze formally these effects using a game 
theoretical model. 
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF SETTLEMENT 
It is believed that at least 90 percent of civil suits are settled in the 
United States.163 Therefore, it is not surprising that there exists a 
broad literature on the economics of settlements. This Part reviews 
                                                                                                                  
162. See infra Parts IV.C.3, V (showing derivation of this result).  
163. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 
8 (1986); Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudi-
cation on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 836 (1990); David M. Trubek et al., 
The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 86 (1983). Those who cite such 
numbers typically rely on data on the percentage of cases that are resolved without a trial, 
but point out that such statistics may not accurately reflect settlement rates. See, e.g., David 
Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation Costs, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1721, 1725 n.6 (2005) (“Recent data on state courts show that about 96% of civil cases are 
resolved without trial. Similarly, recent data on federal courts demonstrate that approximate-
ly 98% of civil cases are resolved short of trial. These percentages, however, may overstate 
or understate the settlement rate. Because cases that are resolved without trial may have 
been dismissed or abandoned, 96% or 98% may overstate the settlement rate. But because 
disputes may be settled before complaints are filed, 96% or 98% may understate the settle-
ment rate.”) (citations omitted). 
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three important settlement models: the basic, the injunctive, and the 
delayed entry settlement models. This review not only demonstrates 
how settlement models have evolved to account for the peculiar dy-
namics encountered in infringement cases in the pharmaceutical sec-
tor, it also highlights important observations that are directly relevant 
to discussing the effects of restricting RPSs. After reviewing these 
models, in Part IV.C, this Article uses the delayed entry settlement 
model to study the incentives of a patentee (“P”) and a generic manu-
facturer (“G”), and to estimate their expected payoffs after settling. 
First, this Article reviews the basic settlement model pioneered by 
Landes,164 Gould,165 and Posner.166 The basic model provides insights 
on many important issues, including why an overwhelming majority 
of cases settle, and why we ought to care about designing laws and 
standards that govern legal disputes given that an overwhelming ma-
jority of cases settle. Briefly stated, parties settle because it is cheaper 
than continuing with litigation,167 and we care because laws and 
standards shape parties’ bargaining positions in settlement negotia-
tions.168 Early extensions of the basic settlement model also explain 
how differences in expectations can cause a small proportion of cases 
to be litigated despite the availability of a cheaper option, i.e., set-
tling.169 This final observation is particularly important for identifying 
the effect of illegalizing RPSs on the frequency of litigation. 
Nonetheless, the basic settlement model is not perfect. For in-
stance, it assumes that parties can only transfer wealth through settle-
ments, and that they cannot affect their future rights. This assumption 
is clearly violated when settlements contain injunctive clauses.170 
Therefore, it is important to relax this assumption in order to incorpo-
                                                                                                                  
164. William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 
(1971).  
165. John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973).  
166. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Admin-
istration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). 
167. This is a standard assumption in the literature. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benja-
min Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1984) (“We 
assume that litigation costs to the parties are greater than settlement costs . . . .”). 
168. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 414 (4th ed. 2003) 
(“Bargaining is more important than trials for the resolution of most disputes. However, 
bargaining occurs in the shadow of the law. In other words, expectations about trials deter-
mine the outcomes of bargains.”). 
169. Id. at 406 (“Game theory explains why rational bargainers sometimes fail to settle 
their disputes and end up in trial. Although there are several strands of the argument, the 
simplest explanation is that trials occur because the parties have different expectations about 
the value of the trial . . . .”); see also Priest & Klein, supra note 167, at 4 (presenting “a 
model of the litigation process that clarifies the relationship between the set of disputes 
settled and the set litigated” while assuming settlement is cheaper than litigation). 
170. See infra Part IV.A. 
No. 1] Reverse Payments, Perverse Incentives 27 
 
rate injunctive settlements, because reverse payments are unlikely to 
occur unless the settlement agreement contains an injunctive clause.171  
The injunctive settlement model, proposed by Professors Hylton 
and Cho, provides a framework for analyzing parties’ incentives when 
they have the ability to craft injunctive settlement agreements.172 This 
model is particularly useful for studying the way patentees and gener-
ic manufacturers are likely to structure settlement agreements when 
reverse payments are legal. Later, this Article shows that a patentee 
has an incentive to offer a generic manufacturer a reverse payment in 
exchange for delaying entry until the expiration of its patent under a 
wide range of circumstances.173 
When reverse payments are legal, as demonstrated in Part IV.C.1, 
the parties do not possess the necessary incentives to delay entry to a 
date that is earlier than the expiration of the branded manufacturer’s 
patent. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the injunctive set-
tlement model to analyze parties’ incentives. But, when RPSs are ille-
gal, the patentee can no longer offer a sum of money to the generic 
company in exchange for delaying entry until its patent expires. In 
these cases, the parties can only negotiate over the date of entry, 
which typically is before the expiration of the patent, to settle their 
dispute and avoid litigation costs. Formalizing this type of settlement 
requires extending the simple injunctive model to allow the parties to 
negotiate over the date of entry rather than a monetary settlement 
amount to be transferred from one party to another. This Article de-
velops such a model, the “delayed entry model,” in Part IV.C. 
After developing the delayed entry model, this Article uses it to 
study the settlement incentives and decisions of P and G under differ-
ent legal regimes. The results obtained from this analysis, in turn, are 
directly relevant to P’s and G’s investment decisions in earlier stages, 
which are studied in Part V. 
A. The Basic Model 
The basic economic model of settlement involves plaintiffs and 
defendants who compare the relative costs and benefits of going to 
trial and settling a legal dispute. Each party is willing to settle only if 
the net benefit from doing so is greater than the net expected benefit 
                                                                                                                  
171. See infra Part IV.A (explaining that parties are unlikely to have RPSs under the 
simple model, unless the plaintiff is somehow forced to sue the defendant). 
172. Keith N. Hylton & Sungjoon Cho, The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settle-
ments, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 181 (2010). 
173. See infra Part IV.B.2, (demonstrating that parties are likely to have RPSs if (1) they 
have similar bargaining powers, (2) they have asymmetric bargaining powers but the patent 
is weak, or (3) the generic manufacturer’s litigation costs are small in comparison to its 
expected return from litigation).  
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from going to trial. Further, they are assumed to know three things174: 
the monetary value (“J”) of a favorable judgment for the plaintiff,175 
and the cost of litigation for each party (Lp and Ld for the plaintiff and 
defendant, respectively). Moreover, it is assumed that each party es-
timates the probability that the plaintiff will obtain a favorable judg-
ment at trial (Pp and Pd refer to the plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
estimates, respectively).  
Using this notation, a plaintiff expects a payoff of (Pp x J) − Lp by 
going to trial. The plaintiff is willing to settle if his payoff from set-
tling is greater than his expected payoff from going to trial, or if: 
 S > (Pp x J) − Lp (1) 
where S is the settlement offer. 
Similarly, the defendant expects to incur a loss of (Pd x J) + Ld by 
going to trial. Accordingly, the cost of settlement for the defendant is 
less than the expected cost of going to trial if: 
 (Pd x J) + Ld > S (2) 
(1) and (2) summarize the intuitive result that the plaintiff is only 
willing to accept settlement offers that are sufficiently large and that 
the defendant is only willing to make settlement offers that are  
sufficiently small. Whether the parties can eventually agree on mutu-
ally acceptable settlement terms depends on whether the highest  
settlement offer the defendant is willing to make exceeds the 
 lowest settlement offer the plaintiff is willing to accept. This condi-
tion can be expressed in symbols by combining (1) and 
(2): (Pd x J) + Ld > (Pp x J) − Lp. Rearranging this inequality, we 
have176: 
 L/J > (Pp − Pd) (3) 
where L denotes the sum of litigation expenses (Lp + Ld). 
Inequality (3) describes the conditions under which rational par-
ties decide to settle. Specifically, they are likely to settle if: (1) the 
costs (“L”) that can be avoided through settlement are large, and 
                                                                                                                  
174. This Article assumes no settlement costs for the sake of brevity, because the inclu-
sion of costs, which do not exceed litigation costs, does not alter this Article’s conclusions. 
It is common in the literature to assume that settlement costs are less than litigation costs. 
See supra note 167. 
175. In the simple model of settlement, the plaintiff’s gains are the defendant’s losses. As 
such, the cost of a negative judgment to the defendant equals J. This assumption is relaxed 
in Part IV.B, infra. 
176. This condition is equivalent to another. See Priest & Klein, supra note 167, at 13 
(condition expressed in inequality (6)).  
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(2) the plaintiff is not much more optimistic than the defendant re-
garding his likelihood of securing a favorable judgment, i.e., Pp is not 
much larger than Pd.177 
Although the basic model provides strong insights as to when and 
why parties may wish to settle, it cannot explain why parties would 
ever engage in RPSs, unless the plaintiff were somehow forced to 
bring a claim in the first place178 and litigation costs exceeded the 
plaintiff’s expected gains from trial. This is because the basic model 
assumes that (1) the settlement’s only function is to facilitate a wealth 
transfer from one party to the other without generating anything of 
further value for either party, and (2) the plaintiff would not bring a 
claim if he expected to make payments to the defendant to avoid pro-
ceeding with trial.179 
However, in some contexts, including patent infringement cases, 
the first assumption is violated. A recent paper by Professors Hylton 
and Cho recognizes this point and describes the problem as follows:  
The economics of settlement in injunctive litigation 
are not fully explained by the [basic] model because 
it ignores settlements that implement the injunction 
sought by the plaintiff. For example, in the patent in-
fringement context, a settlement implementing the 
terms of the injunction sought by the plaintiff in-
volves the defendant exiting the market to let the 
plaintiff firm sell at the monopoly price.180 
Stated differently, settlements can be used to allow the plaintiff to 
purchase outcomes that are valuable to the plaintiff. Therefore, injunc-
tions generate monetary surplus through legal disputes. In these cases, 
the “reverse payment” can be interpreted as the mutually agreed upon 
price for the outcome desired by the plaintiff, namely the injunction.  
                                                                                                                  
177. For the purposes of this Article, a meticulous inquiry into what leads parties to have 
diverging beliefs is not necessary. For more on this subject, see Priest & Klein, supra note 
167, at 17 (demonstrating that under simple hypothesis, parties are more likely to have 
diverging beliefs if the case is a close one). 
178. One might think that the Hatch-Waxman Act does exactly this. It does not. It gives 
the patentee a choice: either allow generic companies to enter the market or sue. If injunc-
tive settlements were not possible, a patentee would choose not to sue the generic manufac-
turer if it expected later to make reverse payments to avoid litigation costs.  
179. In a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (“SPNE”), the most common solution con-
cept in the literature on the economics of settlements, parties must have no way to unilater-
ally increase their payoffs. See generally ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED 
ECONOMISTS 55–141 (1992) (explaining dynamic games and the concept of SPNE). In this 
simple settlement model, a situation in which the plaintiff initiates a case against the de-
fendant only later to make a reverse payment cannot be an SPNE, because the plaintiff can 
increase his payoff from −S to 0 by simply not suing in the first place.  
180. Hylton & Cho, supra note 172, at 186. 
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The next Part considers the economics of injunctive settlements in 
more detail, identifying conditions under which parties choose to en-
gage in RPSs. 
B. The Economics of Injunctive Settlements 
To study injunctive settlements, Hylton and Cho extended the 
basic model to incorporate the possibility of parties allocating future 
rights through settlements.181 To be precise, injunctive settlements 
refer to cases where the parties settle on terms that require the defend-
ant to cease an activity complained of by the plaintiff. In the typical 
pharmaceutical patent infringement case, the producer of a patented 
drug seeks to enjoin the producer of a generic version from entering 
the market. 
One may wonder why the basic settlement model does not fully 
explain the interactions between P and G. In particular, why can one 
not simply assume that P values the injunction more than G, incorpo-
rate this assumption in the standard settlement model, and repeat the 
analysis? To answer this question, consider the four states of the 
world and the resources to be allocated between the parties under each 
state. 
 
Table 1 
State of the World Resources to be Allocated Be-
tween P and G 
No-Legal Dispute Duopoly Profits 
Proceed with Trial Monopoly or Duopoly Profits 
Basic Settlement Duopoly Profits 
Injunctive Settlement Monopoly Profits 
 
Unless P initiates a legal dispute, G will be able to enter the mar-
ket and sell the generic version of P’s drug. For simplicity, we may 
assume that G is the only competitor of P,182 in which case G and P 
                                                                                                                  
181. Id. 
182. There are some empirical and theoretical reasons to think that this assumption is 
harmless. As an empirical matter, “the FTC (2002) reports that at most two generic compa-
nies challenged probabilistic patents in the past.” Gratz, supra note 33, at 5 n.5. Moreover, 
as noted in K-Dur, “the initial generic challenger is necessarily the most motivated because, 
unlike all subsequent challengers, it stands to benefit from the 180-day exclusivity period.” 
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated. Nevertheless, it is 
hard to know the exact impact of relaxing this assumption on the reward shifting effect 
without further research. 
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would split duopoly profits, denoted by 2πd, evenly in the market for 
P’s drug.183 
On the other hand, if P sues G, and the parties do not settle, the 
court eventually makes a decision, which de facto determines the total 
producer surplus to be allocated between P and G. If the court enjoins 
G from operating in the market, it eliminates competition for P. In this 
case, P’s monopoly profits are denoted by πm and G’s profits are zero. 
This implies an increase in the joint profits of G and P, because 
πm > 2πd.184 If the court decides not to enjoin G, then G is entitled to 
enter the market, and the parties are again expected to make duopoly 
profits of 2πd, collectively. Therefore, a court decision leads either to 
an allocation of monopoly profits to P, or to duopoly profits to be split 
between the two parties. 
When the parties settle through a standard settlement, they are in-
capable of reaching an agreement where G is enjoined from operating 
in the market in the future. This implies that the settlement will in-
volve some monetary transfer between G and P and that G and P will 
later compete against each other in the market, at which point they 
will therefore obtain duopoly profits. 
On the other hand, an injunctive settlement is one where G agrees 
to exit the market in exchange for the other terms of the settlement. In 
this case, the joint profits of the parties are increased from 2πd to πm. 
The most important thing this brief analysis highlights is that 
standard settlements and injunctive settlements lead to different total 
profits to be shared between P and G. This being the case, it is only 
natural to expect that the possibility of enjoining G in a settlement 
may change the dynamics of settlement negotiations. The next Part 
describes how the availability of injunctive settlements, if legal, give 
P an incentive to make reverse payments. 
1. When Do Parties Settle? 
If the parties litigate, P’s patent will be found valid and infringed 
with a probability, X, which reflects the strength of the patent: the 
closer X is to one, the stronger the patent.185 P and G, however, are 
not perfectly informed about this probability. Instead, they only have 
estimates of this probability, denoted by Xp and Xg respectively. Their 
estimates are subject to error, so that Xp and Xg need not necessarily 
equal each other or X. Parties base their decisions on these estimates.  
                                                                                                                  
183. Even if profits are asymmetric, the qualitative results do not change. 
184. This inequality reflects a standard assumption in the literature. See, e.g., Shapiro, 
supra note 18, at 92 (assuming that “combined duopoly proﬁts are less than monopoly 
proﬁts, 2πD < πM”). If this assumption were violated, the monopolist patentee could increase 
its profits by creating a subsidiary and competing with it, which would contradict the initial 
supposition that the patentee is a monopolist. 
185. See supra Part III.C (discussing probabilistic patents in further detail).  
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Accordingly, G’s expected return from litigation is (1 − Xg)πd.186 
In this Section, all settlement offers will require G to exit the market 
for the duration of P’s patent. G also faces litigation costs of Lg, mak-
ing its expected payoff from litigation (1 − Xg)πd − Lg. Therefore, if G 
receives an injunctive settlement offer of S from P, G will accept it 
only if: 
 (1 − Xg)πd - Lg < S (4) 
P, on the other hand, expects to make monopoly profits of πm 
with a probability of Xp, and duopoly profits of πd with a probability 
of (1 − Xp). Therefore, P’s expected payoff from litigation is 
Xpπm + (1 − Xp)πd - Lp, where Lp denotes P’s litigation costs. An in-
junctive settlement prohibiting G from entering the market enables P 
to earn monopoly profits at the cost of a payment of S to G. Hence, 
P’s expected payoff from settlement is πm - S. Accordingly, P’s ex-
pected payoff from settlement exceeds its payoff from litigation when 
πm − S > Xpπm + (1 − Xp)πd − Lp, which can alternatively be expressed 
as: 
 (1 − Xp)(πm − πd) + Lp > S. (5) 
Inequalities (4) and (5) imply that an injunctive settlement will 
take place as long as (1 − Xp)(πm − πd) + Lp > (1 − Xg)πd − Lg, which is 
equivalent to: 
 (1 − Xp)(πm − 2πd) + 2L > (Xp − Xg)πd (6) 
where 2L is the sum of litigation costs. 
Inequality (6) demonstrates that injunctive settlements will take 
place as long as parties are not relatively over-optimistic187 regarding 
their prospects of obtaining a beneficial judgment through litigation. 
In particular, parties will reach an injunctive settlement if Xp ≤ Xg. In 
such cases, the right hand side of (6) is not positive. As the left hand 
side of (6) is always positive (because πm > 2πd), the inequality will 
hold. 
When the parties have good estimates of the strength of the pa-
tent, the gap between Xg and Xp is likely to be small, and the parties 
                                                                                                                  
186. This Article does not consider complications such as the 180-day exclusivity for the 
first moving generic. See infra Part VI. 
187. Relative over-optimism can be defined with greater precision. The parties are over-
optimistic if P’s estimate of the likelihood of securing a favorable judgment for himself 
exceeds G’s estimate of the same by a margin of (!!!!!)(!!!!!!)!!"!!! . This condition is more 
likely to hold when (1) litigation costs are small, and (2) π!  is large in comparison to the 
surplus π! − 2π!  generated from the injunction. 
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will end up reaching an injunctive settlement. For expositional pur-
poses this Article assumes that parties have perfect information re-
garding the strength of the patent, i.e., that Xg = Xp = X. In Part V.D, 
this Article revisits the issue of relative over-optimism and shows that 
incorporating it only strengthens the results.188 
2. When Do Parties Agree on Reverse Payment Settlements? 
If parties are not overly optimistic, an injunctive settlement will 
occur. The question still arises: will it necessarily involve a reverse 
payment? Stated differently, is it in the plaintiff’s best interest to buy 
the injunction from the defendant, or to proceed to trial and obtain an 
injunction through litigation? To answer this question, note that ine-
qualities (4) and (5) imply that a successful settlement, S, must be 
within the following range: 
 S∈ [(1 − X)πd − Lg, (1 − X)(πm − πd) + Lp] (7) 
The lower bound for the settlement range is likely to be positive 
when (1) X is small, i.e., the patent is weak, or (2) πd is large in com-
parison to litigation costs. Furthermore, if the parties have similar 
bargaining power, they will split the surplus that they generate 
through an injunctive settlement close to evenly. In those cases, S will 
be close to the midpoint of the settlement range expressed in (7). 
When the parties’ litigation costs are equal, this midpoint is (!!!)!!! , 
which is positive.189  
To summarize, when allowed, the parties will reach an injunctive 
settlement involving reverse payments as long as one of the following 
conditions is met: (1) they have similar bargaining power, (2) the pa-
tent is weak enough to offset any imbalance in bargaining power, or 
(3) G’s litigation costs are small in comparison to his expected return 
from litigation. 
Although dynamic effects will be considered to a greater extent in 
Part V, it is worth noting a simple and important point that relates to 
G’s ex ante incentives. As the above analysis demonstrates, when 
payments are the only mode of compensation,190 G has no incentive to 
enter the market unless it expects to receive a reverse payment.191 If S 
                                                                                                                  
188. See infra Part V, for a discussion. 
189. When the parties’ litigation costs are not equal, the midpoint of the settlement range 
is positive as long as (1 − X)πm > (Lg − Lp), that is, as long as G’s litigation costs do not 
exceed P’s litigation costs by a large margin.  
190. If DESs are possible, then G may still have an incentive to invest in entry, even if it 
does not expect a payment from P. See supra Part IV.B (introducing DESs and illustrating 
this point).  
191. See supra Part II.A (explaining how the Hatch-Waxman Act structures entry for ge-
nerics). A stylized version of the interactions between P and G is presented as a sequential 
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is negative, entry induces a payoff of −S, whereas doing nothing in-
duces a payoff of zero.192 Therefore, a generic company is likely to 
attempt entry only when it expects reverse payments, and this, as 
demonstrated above, happens under a very wide variety of circum-
stances. 
C. Delayed Entry Settlements 
Although the model of injunctive settlements provides insights 
regarding settling parties’ incentives, it needs to be modified to cap-
ture one of the most prevalent features of reverse payment settle-
ments. Reverse payment settlements require the entrant to postpone 
entry, increasing expected joint profits by increasing the amount of 
time during which the patentee enjoys monopoly profits. The injunc-
tive settlement model does not incorporate the fact that parties can 
negotiate over the exact time of entry, continuing P’s monopoly pow-
er over a portion of the remaining patent life. Simply stated, the in-
junctive settlement model does not allow the parties to choose the 
length of the injunction: it must be the remaining duration of the pa-
tent. 
The model can easily be extended to account for variable length 
injunctions. In particular, one can consider a new variable, α, which 
denotes the ratio between the time remaining until the agreed upon 
entry and the remaining patent life (e.g., if the parties agree on entry 
in seven years, and the remaining patent life is ten years, then 
α = 0.7). One can then calculate P’s payoff from settling as 
απm + (1 − α)πd and G’s expected payoff as (1 − α)πd. The effect of 
this modification on parties’ settlement strategies depends on whether 
or not reverse payment settlements are possible. 
1. Parties’ Incentives When Reverse Payment Settlements Are Per Se 
Legal 
As can be inferred from the discussion regarding injunctive set-
tlements, absent legal restrictions, P and G have incentives to delay 
G’s entry as much as possible (i.e., until the patent expires)193 in ex-
change for a reverse payment that compensates G for his forgone ex-
pected profits. When α = 1, P’s and G’s payoffs from settlement are 
identical to the corresponding values in Part IV.B, namely πm − S and 
                                                                                                                  
game. See infra Part V. Filing an ANDA corresponds to G’s strategy in the second period of 
the drug game.  
192. In other words, a strategy profile where G is entering and later settling cannot be a 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium because G can increase its payoff from −S to zero by 
not entering in the first place. See supra note 179. 
193. This assumption implicitly incorporates the fact that the parties cannot legally delay 
entry beyond the patent expiration date.  
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S, respectively. This result is not a coincidence. The injunctive settle-
ment model simply assumes that through a settlement, P can either 
enjoin G for the entirety of the remaining patent term, or not at all. In 
symbols, it assumes that the settlement must select between α = 0 or 
α = 1. Therefore, the conditions under which it is preferable for P and 
G to have a reverse payment settlement with α = 1, rather than no set-
tlement at all, correspond to the conditions discussed in Part IV.B. 
Next, note that for the settling parties, a settlement with α = 1 is 
preferable to a settlement with α < 1. By increasing α, i.e., the dura-
tion of P’s monopoly, the parties increase their joint profits from set-
tlement from απm + 2(1 − α)πd to simply πm. Since joint profits are 
increased, the parties can engage in simple Coasean bargaining to 
move from a settlement with α < 1 to a settlement with α = 1. If re-
verse payments are legal and the parties are not overly optimistic,194 
then P and G have the incentive to agree on a reverse payment settle-
ment that delays entry until the patent expires. 
 
2. Parties’ Incentives When Reverse Payment Settlements Are 
Restricted 
When RPSs are illegal, the parties lose the mechanism through 
which P can transfer some of the surplus created by G’s delayed en-
try, i.e., P’s profits due to the lack of competition less what G loses by 
not entering early. Absent this mechanism, the cost of litigation still 
gives parties incentives to settle due to reasons described in Part IV.A. 
In particular, the parties can settle on a date of entry that offsets the 
expected payoffs to each party from litigation.  
In order for both parties to accept a settlement with entry date de-
scribed by α, both parties’ settlement payoffs must exceed their corre-
sponding expected litigation payoffs. Or, in symbols, it must be true 
that 
 απm + (1 − α)πd > Xπm + (1 − X)πd − Lp (8) 
and (1 − α)πd > (1 − X)πd − Lg, (9) 
where X represents the parties’ accurate belief that the patent will be 
found valid and infringed in litigation.  
Without information on parties’ litigation costs and bargaining 
power, it is impossible to pinpoint the exact date of entry in a delayed 
entry settlement. But, if for simplicity the parties are assumed to have 
                                                                                                                  
194. See infra Part V.D, for a detailed study of over-optimism. 
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equal bargaining power and litigation costs they will settle on an entry 
date described by195 
 !!=!X + ! !!!!!!!!!(!!!!!). (10) 
In other words, when reverse payments are not allowed, we 
should expect parties to settle on an entry date that sets the payoff 
from settlement greater than the expected return from litigation for 
both parties. 
An important corollary is that as long as the parties do not believe 
that the patent is almost ironclad,196 they will reach a settlement with 
α < 1, i.e., G promises to delay entry until some date prior to the expi-
ration of the patent. Thus, for patents that are not close to being iron-
clad, restricting RPSs induces earlier generic entry than under per se 
legality, since, as shown in Part IV.C.1, α = 1 when reverse payment 
settlements are per se legal.197 
D. Parties’ Settlement Decisions and Ex Post Payoffs Across Regimes 
as a Function of Patent Strength 
Given the observations in Parts IV.B and IV.C, parties’ ex post 
payoffs, i.e., payoffs excluding any costs that may have been incurred 
prior to their settlement decisions, can be calculated across legal re-
gimes and as a function of patent strength. Identifying parties’ ex post 
payoffs will be useful for studying generic companies’ entry decisions 
and dynamic R&D decisions in Part V. 
1. When Reverse Payments are Legal 
As discussed in Part IV.B, when reverse payments are legal, 
 the parties reach a settlement where P makes a payment of  
S = ½(1 − X)πm to G, and G delays entry until the end of the patent 
term. Given that G does not enter during the patent term, P expects to 
collect monopoly profits of πm for the duration of the patent’s life. 
                                                                                                                  
195. This expected entry date corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution that P and G 
reach when they have equal bargaining power. See generally NOLAN MCCARTY & ADAM 
MEIROWITZ, POLITICAL GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 275–80 (2007) (providing a 
brief introduction to bargaining theory, a definition of the Nash bargaining solution, and the 
axiomatic foundations of this solution concept). See infra, Appendix A, for the calculations 
necessary to derive this result.  
196. More specifically, as long as the parties do not believe that the patent has strength 
exceeding 1 − ! !!!!!!! !!!!! !!, denoted XC, they will reach a settlement with α < 1. Note that 
since !! − 2!! > 0, XC < 1. 
197. For patents with strength exceeding XC, see supra note 196, a settlement would in-
duce the same result, i.e., entry at α = 1. 
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Therefore, P’s ex post payoff is monopoly profits less settlement 
payments, or  
 πm − ½(1 − X)πm = ½(1 + X)πm. (11) 
Since G agrees to exit the market, its only gains consist of settle-
ment payments from P: 
 ½(1 − X)πm. (12) 
2. When Reverse Payments are Illegal 
As discussed in Part IV.C, when reverse payments are illegal, the 
parties structure a DES where G agrees to enter at date described by !!, which is expressed in equation (10). Because there are no settle-
ment payments from one party to the other, the parties’ ex post pay-
offs consist only of profits they collect in the market. Therefore, P’s 
and G’s ex post payoffs are respectively given by  
 αIπm + (1 − αI)πd (13) 
and  (1 − αI)πd, (14) 
where αI is the entry date described in (10).198 
V. REWARD SHIFTING 
Part IV summarizes parties’ incentives and payoffs under per se 
legality and illegality of reverse payment settlements. That analysis 
assumes two things: (1) that a patentee P engages in R&D and comes 
up with a new invention; and (2) that another party G decides to incur 
entry costs to market a generic version of that invention.  
That may not always be the case, however, as the legal regime 
may have an effect on whether P invests in R&D in the first place and 
whether G makes the necessary investment to enter the market if P 
comes up with a new invention. This Part incorporates these ex ante 
effects by using a stylized model which is best summarized by the 
following game tree.199 
 
                                                                                                                  
198. This assumes that the patent is not stronger than XC. See supra, note 197. However, 
if X > XC, G does not have an incentive to enter because it would incur net losses, and there-
fore there would be no settlement. See infra Part V. 
199. See generally GIBBONS, supra note 179, at 57–61 (explaining how to structure game 
trees and how to use them to compute the backwards-induction outcomes of games). 
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Figure 1: Game Tree 
As reflected in the game tree in Stage 1, P makes R&D decisions 
that have a direct effect on the likelihood with which it succeeds in 
inventing a new product or process, which it subsequently patents. In 
stage 2, G chooses whether or not to make the necessary investment to 
enter the market. When G does not invest, P remains the only supplier 
and therefore retains its monopoly on the invention for the duration of 
the patent. When G does invest, P and G play the “settlement game” 
which is described at length in Parts IV.C and IV.D. To highlight how 
illegalizing RPSs would affect parties’ decisions to invest, this Part 
will assume, as in Parts IV.C and IV.D, that the parties have accurate 
estimates regarding the strength of P’s patent. This is a simplifying 
assumption, and as demonstrated in Part V.D, the reward shifting ef-
fect presented in this Part increases when this assumption is relaxed. 
To solve this “game,” this Article uses backward induction, the 
most common method used among scholars to study settlements.200 
This method requires a player to predict what she and other players 
will do in the future under various circumstances.201 She then chooses 
the action leading to those circumstances under which the other play-
ers act in a way that is most favorable to her.202 For instance, when 
making a decision in Stage 1, P will consider whether G will enter in 
                                                                                                                  
200. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Suc-
cess of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1996) (“In analyzing this case, as well as 
subsequent cases, we are going to apply ‘backward induction.’ This approach is the standard 
method used by economists for analyzing strategic interactions in which parties make deci-
sions over several time periods.”). See generally GIBBONS, supra note 179, at 57–61 (ex-
plaining backward induction). 
201. For a more detailed description of how backward induction is applied to solve dy-
namic games, see GIBBONS, supra note 179, at 57–61. 
202. Here the game is deterministic, and therefore no uncertainty is involved. Part V.D 
considers the effects of uncertainty and assumes that actors seek to maximize expected 
values.  
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Stage 2 if P in fact comes up with an invention. If P believes that G is 
likely to enter in Stage 2, then P has to predict the outcome of the set-
tlement game in Stage 3. P will only engage in R&D if it believes the 
future benefits associated with that outcome outweigh the cost of 
R&D.  
G’s decision-making process will be similar to that of P’s but will 
require fewer predictions. G only needs to compare the cost of the 
investment necessary to enter with what it expects to gain from the 
settlement game. Fortunately, the settlement game was already solved 
in Part IV.D. Therefore, G’s entry decision can be analyzed by com-
paring its expected payoff expressed in expressions (12) or (14), de-
pending on the legal regime, to the cost F of investing for entry. 
Choosing not to invest results in a payoff of zero. G’s entry decision 
is analyzed next, because P’s decision in Stage 1, as explained in the 
preceding paragraph, depends on G’s decision in Stage 2. 
A. Generic Manufacturer’s Investment Decision 
When reverse payments are legal, G expects to obtain an RPS 
from P in the amount of ½(1 − X)πm, in exchange for delaying entry 
until P’s patent expires. G’s expected payoff from entry is therefore 
its expected gains from settlement minus the cost of investing in en-
try, namely ½(1 − X)πm − F. Since G’s outside option is not to invest, 
which results in a payoff of zero, G enters only when 
 (!!!)!!! > !. (15)  
When reverse payments are illegal, G expects to reach a DES 
with P. This option has a value of (1 − αI)πd − F, and therefore G in-
vests only when  
 (1 − !!)!! > !.  (16) 
Plugging in the value for αI described in (10), this condition can 
be expressed as 
 1 − X − ! !!!!!!!(!!!!!)!! !! > !. (17) 
Simply by comparing the conditions under which G enters in each 
legal regime, one can see that entry is more likely to occur when re-
verse payments are legal.203 This is because the expected ex post pay-
off to G under per se legality, ½(1 − X)πm, exceeds the expected ex 
                                                                                                                  
203. This assumes, of course, that the drug has been invented in Stage 1.  
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post payoff when reverse payments are illegal, 
1 - X - L πm ! 2πd
2(πm!- πd)πd πd. A closer look at these conditions reveals even 
more about G’s decision to enter: illegalizing RPSs affects G’s deci-
sion to enter only if the patent is sufficiently strong.  
To observe this consequence, identify the conditions under which 
G enters as a function of patent strength. Manipulating (15) reveals 
that G makes the necessary investment to enter only if the patent 
strength is below a certain threshold value: 
 X < 1 − !!!! ≡ !!, (18) 
where XL denotes the threshold patent strength under per se legality. 
A similar calculation reveals that when reverse payments are not al-
lowed, G is willing to enter when 
 X < 1 − ! !!!!!!!(!!!!!)!! − !!! ≡ !!, (19) 
where XI denotes the threshold patent strength under per se illegality. 
It is easy to verify that XI < XL,204 which implies that illegalizing re-
verse payments eliminates investment in entry only when the patent is 
stronger than XI. This observation can be better illustrated by a simple 
figure: 
 
                                                                                                                  
204. To see this, note that XI ≡ 1 − ! !!!!!!! !!!!! !! − !!! < 1 − !!! < 1 − !!!! ≡!XL, where 
the second inequality follows from the fact that 2!! < !! . 
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Figure 2: G’s Incentives to Invest as a Function of Patent Strength and 
Legal Regime 
As shown in Figure 2, a switch from per se legality to illegality 
eliminates investment by G to enter when X is between XI and XL. 
This observation reflects the concerns voiced by Richard Posner in 
Asahi Glass205: “A ban on reverse-payment settlements would reduce 
the incentive to challenge patents by reducing the challenger’s settle-
ment options should he be sued for infringement, and so might well be 
thought anticompetitive.”206 
If, however, investment in entry is motivated by the prospect of 
extracting favorable settlements in the future, such investments do not 
in fact generate additional welfare.207 This notion is explained next. 
B. Effects on G’s Entry Date 
Illegalizing RPSs has the effect of eliminating investment in entry 
by generic companies for intermediately strong patents, but it also has 
the effect of inducing earlier entry when G does decide to invest in 
entry. This is because entry occurs at patent expiration (α = 1) when 
reverse payments are legal, but at some time before patent expiration 
(α < 1) under per se illegality.208 
                                                                                                                  
205. Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
206. Id. at 994. 
207. Entry can occur earlier under per se legality if (1) the patent is intermediately strong, 
(2) the parties suffer from over-optimism, (3) the parties are unable to reach a settlement, 
and (4) subsequently the patent is found to be invalid or not infringed. This implies that the 
value of holding an intermediately strong patent is even lower under per se legality. Part 
V.D discusses this case after Parts IV.B and IV.C introduce and discuss all necessary ef-
fects. 
208. See Part IV.C.2 and supra notes 197 and 198, which demonstrate that the settlement 
date is prior to patent expiration (α < 1), unless the patent strength exceeds 1 −
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If the patent is weak, X < XI, both regimes induce investment by 
G, which enters at time α = 1 under per se legality, but at time α < 1 
under per se illegality. Thus, per se legality protects P’s ability to 
charge supra-competitive prices for its drug for a longer duration, 
which results in reduction in consumer welfare and increased 
deadweight loss.  
If the patent is intermediately strong, so that XI < X < XL, then G 
invests in entry only if there is a rule of per se legality. However, the 
parties decide to settle, delaying G’s entry until the end of the patent 
expiration period (α = 1). Therefore, G’s investment in entry does not 
reduce the length of time during which P is able to charge supra-
competitive prices; the two regimes produce the same effect. 
G has no incentive to invest in entry under either legal regime 
when X > XL because investment costs exceed the potential gains 
from settlement. Therefore, both regimes have the same effect on ex 
post social welfare.  
These observations are combined and summarized in Figure 3. 
An important result highlighted by Figure 3 is that illegalizing reverse 
payments induces earlier entry when patents are weak, but has no ef-
fect on the entry date otherwise. 
Figure 3: G’ Time of Entry as a Function of Patent Strength and Legal 
Regime 
C. The Reward Shifting Effect and Implications 
Figure 3 describes G’s decision to invest in entry as a function of 
patent strength and the conditions under which the parties enter a re-
verse payment or delayed entry settlement. Applying these conditions 
                                                                                                                  ! !!!!!!! !!!!! !!!≡ XC. Since G invests only when X< XI< XC, it follows that whenever there is a 
delayed entry settlement, entry occurs prior to patent expiration. 
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to the observations in Part IV, the expected reward to P from becom-
ing a patentee can be calculated.  
When X < XI, G invests in entry regardless of the legal regime. 
The parties reach an RPS under per se legality and a DES under per se 
illegality. As explained in Part IV.D, P’s expected reward from be-
coming a patentee corresponds to the ex post payoffs expressed in 
(11) and (13), i.e. ½(1 + X)πm under per se legality and  
αIπm + (1 − αI)πd under per se illegality. A comparison of these two 
values suggests that per se legality always provides greater expected 
rewards for very weak patents and greater expected returns for patents 
whose strength is close to XI under a range of conditions.209 
For intermediately strong inventions, i.e., when XI < X < XL, G 
invests in entry under per se legality but refrains from investment un-
der per se illegality. Accordingly, the reward for being a patentee un-
der per se legality is, as in the weak invention case, given by 
expression (11), ½(1 + X)πm. Under per se illegality, however, entry 
does not occur, and therefore the reward associated with being a pa-
tentee is πm. 
When X > XL, the reward associated with becoming a patentee is 
the same under per se legality and illegality, namely πm, because there 
is no potential entry by G. These results are summarized in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: P’s Reward as a Function of Patent Strength and Legal Re-
gime 
Figure 4 highlights an important result: illegalizing reverse pay-
ments reduces the reward for holding a weak patent while simultane-
ously increasing the reward for holding an intermediately strong 
                                                                                                                  
209. More specifically, F > L is a sufficient but not necessary condition for per se legality 
to generate greater expected rewards for holding a weak patent. See infra Appendix B, for 
the derivation of this result. 
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patent. In other words, illegalizing RPSs shifts the reward from weak 
inventions to stronger inventions. The implications of this observation 
can be revealed by a simple application of reward theory. 
First, a pharmaceutical company with a relatively strong project 
may abandon the project when RPSs are per se legal, but be induced 
to carry on with the project under per se illegality. In particular, if the 
cost of continuing with R&D is C, and the probability of successfully 
completing R&D and obtaining a patent is Q, and 
½(1 + X)πm < C/Q < αIπm + (1 − αI)πd, the pharmaceutical company 
will be incentivized to continue with R&D only when RPSs are ille-
gal. 
Second, another budget-constrained pharmaceutical company, 
which has the choice between choosing to engage in R&D for a pro-
ject that will potentially result in a weak invention or a strong inven-
tion, may be induced to choose the weak project when RPSs are legal 
and the strong project when RPSs are illegal. This follows because 
switching from a regime of per se legality to per se illegality increases 
the rewards for the strong project while at the same time reducing the 
rewards for the weak project.  
In sum, per se illegality may shift pharmaceutical R&D efforts 
from weak projects towards stronger projects. 
D. The Exacerbating Effect of Relative Over-Optimism 
Throughout the preceding analyses, this Article assumed that par-
ties do not suffer from relative over-optimism. Relative over-
optimism refers to cases where P and G have diverging beliefs regard-
ing the probability that P’s patent will be found valid and infringed if 
they proceed with litigation. In particular, if P’s estimate of this prob-
ability sufficiently exceeds G’s estimate, the parties will be said to be 
relatively over-optimistic and proceed with litigation. 
To analyze the effects of relative over-optimism, it should first be 
noted that parties are more likely to litigate due to divergences in their 
estimates of P’s probability of securing a favorable judgment under 
per se illegality. The surplus that the parties can generate through set-
tlement is lower under per se illegality due to the fact that the option 
of preserving P’s monopoly profits through an RPS is not available. 
The consequence is that the gains from settling are reduced, making 
the option less desirable to both parties. Appendix C, infra, formalizes 
this point by providing an algebraic proof.  
The effect that relative over-optimism occurs more frequently un-
der per se illegality is better understood by focusing on parties’ incen-
tives to settle as a function of patent strength.  
When the relevant patent is weak, settlement negotiations are 
more likely to break down under per se illegality, though entry still 
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occurs under both legal regimes.210 Because the patent is weak, it is 
likely to be declared invalid through litigation, generating a second 
benefit: the generic company can enter the market and sell a generic 
version of the drug, which produces static benefits in the form of re-
duced deadweight loss. 
When the patent is intermediately strong, G will not attempt entry 
under per se illegality, but will under per se legality. Therefore, under 
per se legality, P and G may occasionally litigate to determine the 
validity of the patent, sometimes leading to the patent being found 
invalid. This scenario will generate static benefits in the form of re-
duced deadweight loss, but at the expense of a dynamic cost: a reduc-
tion in P’s incentive to engage in R&D for intermediately strong 
projects. 
Finally, when the patent is close to being ironclad, entry will not 
occur under either regime. Therefore, divergences in parties’ beliefs 
regarding patent strength will not affect parties’ incentives to enter. 
In sum, per se illegality is likely to increase litigation for weak 
patents, creating additional static benefits at the expense of litigation, 
thereby reducing the reward associated with weak patents even fur-
ther. On the other hand, per se legality will tend to increase litigation 
for intermediately strong patents, increasing potential static gains, but 
at the cost of reducing P’s rewards to becoming a patentee. Therefore, 
potential relative over-optimism appears to magnify the reward shift-
ing effect of per se illegality by reducing the comparative reward for 
holding a weak patent and increasing the comparative reward for 
holding an intermediately strong patent. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article identifies a previously overlooked impact of RPSs: 
the reward shifting effect. Contrary to an assumption underlying the 
circuit courts’ decisions that found RPSs essentially per se legal,211 
RPSs likely hinder technological progress by incentivizing R&D in-
vestment in safe but incremental innovations and discouraging in-
vestment in risky but potentially revolutionary projects. Post FTC v. 
Actavis, it is imperative that courts consider the reward shifting effect 
in applying the rule of reason, as the existence of a patent should not 
justify anticompetitive agreements if they systematically blunt, rather 
than promote, technological progress. In particular, if shifting rewards 
from weak inventions towards stronger ones is deemed to be a social 
                                                                                                                  
210. The threshold X’s will change in response to incorporating the possibility of litiga-
tion, but this does not alter the fact that there will be new threshold patent strengths, serving 
the same function as XI and XL. 
211. See supra Part II.C (reviewing circuit court decisions).  
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benefit, courts ought to weigh it in favor of prohibiting a given RPS 
when applying the rule of reason.  
The main claims in this Article, although quite intuitive, are sup-
ported by and formally derived in a game-theoretical model that cap-
tures the interactions between (potential) patentees and generic 
manufacturers.212 One of the important benefits of using a formal 
model is the possibility of testing the robustness of claims and deter-
mining whether results continue to hold under more general or alter-
native sets of assumptions. This Article conducted one such 
robustness check by extending the model to incorporate situations 
where parties may have incorrect beliefs about the patentee’s likeli-
hood of obtaining a favorable judgment in an infringement suit, and 
demonstrated that the results are only enhanced when this possibility 
is considered.213 Unfortunately, it is impossible to consider all poten-
tially useful extensions in a single article. But it is possible to identify 
potentially fruitful directions for future research. For instance, models 
investigating how the reward shifting is affected by the incentive dis-
tortions that presumably arise out of the 180-day exclusivity period 
and at-risk entry by generic manufacturers are likely to be of value. 
Although these issues were independently studied by law and eco-
nomics scholars,214 how they interact with the reward shifting effect 
remains unknown. 
APPENDICES 
A. Nash Bargaining Solution in Delayed Entry Settlements When 
Parties Have Equal Bargaining Power 
As explained in Part IV.C.2, the parties will be willing to settle if 
two conditions hold:  
 !!! + 1 − ! !! > !!! + 1 − ! !! − !  (A.1) 
and 1 − ! !! > 1 − ! !! − !.  (A.2) 
Given the patent strength X, the Nash bargaining solution in-
volves choosing an entry date (!) which maximizes the product of the 
                                                                                                                  
212. See supra Parts III, IV.  
213. See supra Part V.D.  
214. See Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 6 (considering at-risk entry in the context of 
RPSs); Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 11 at 949 (proposing that “the first generic . . . be 
entitled to the 180-day exclusivity period only if it successfully defeats the patent own-
er . . . , obtains a settlement that permits entry without delay, or can enter the market without 
delay because the patent holder does not sue for infringement”). 
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differences in the parties’ settlement payoffs and expected litigation 
payoffs.215 Or, in symbols: 
 max![ α − X (π! − π!) + L][L − !α − X π!] (A.3) 
s. t. ! − ! (!! − !!) + ! ≥ 0!and ! − !! − ! !! ≥ 0.  (A.4) 
The expression in (A.3) can alternatively be expressed as  
 −(! − !)! !! !! − !! + (! − !) ! !! − 2!! + !!. (A.5) 
The problem (A.3) generates the following first order condition: 
 α! = X + L !!!!!!!(!!!!!)!!.  (A.6) 
That !! maximizes (A.3) is guaranteed by the concavity of the 
expression in (A.5). 
B. Comparing P’s Expected Rewards for Holding a Weak Patent 
Across Legal Regimes  
P’s expected rewards from holding a weak patent under per se le-
gality and illegality are respectively expressed in (11) and (13) as 
 A X = (!!!)!!!  (A.7) 
and B X = α!(X)π! + (1 − α!(X))π!, (A.8) 
where !!(!), defined in (10), is the expected entry date under a DES 
between P and G as a function of the strength of the patent. Since 
A(0) > B(0), and since both A and B are increasing and linear func-
tions of patent strength, it follows that if A(XI) > B(XI), then per se 
legality results in greater expected rewards to P for all weak patents. 
Plugging the expression for !! in (10) into (A.8), and evaluating (A.8) 
and (A.7) at X = XI reveals that 
 A X! = π!(1 − L !!!!!!!!! !!!!! − !!!!)  (A.9) 
and  B X! = 1 − !!! π! + F.  (A.10) 
                                                                                                                  
215. See generally MCCARTY & MEIROWITZ, supra note 195, at 275–80 (providing a 
brief introduction to bargaining theory, a definition of the Nash bargaining solution, and the 
axiomatic foundations of this solution concept). 
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Therefore, ! !! > ! !!  if  
 π! 1 − L !!!!!!!!! !!!!! − !!!! > 1 − !!! π! + F.  (A.11) 
Manipulating this inequality reveals that it is equivalent to the condi-
tion 
 L < 2 1 − !!!! F.  (A.12) 
The minimum value 2 1 − !!!!  can take is 1, since 2!! < !!. 
Therefore, ! !! > ! !!  whenever ! < !, in which case per se le-
gality generates greater expected payoffs to P for all weak patents. 
C. Relative Over-Optimism Leads to Litigation More Frequently 
Under Per Se Illegality 
Under per se legality, the condition for litigation is as expressed 
in (6):  
 !!!! !!!!!!!! + !"!! < X! − X!.  (A.13) 
And the condition for litigation under per se illegality is obtained 
by combining (8) and (9):  
 L !!! + !!!!!! < X! − X! (A.14) 
The left hand side of (A.13) is greater than the left hand side of 
(A.14), since !!!! > ! !!! + !!!!!! . Thus the divergence between the 
two parties’ beliefs (i.e. !! − !!) must be greater under per se legali-
ty than under per se illegality for relative over-optimism to lead to 
litigation. Therefore, per se illegality is likely to lead to more litiga-
tion conditional on G filing an ANDA. 
